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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research studies key aspects of the German energy security equation. It 
attempts to ascertain the origins and motivators of elements in the German energy mix, 
considers the state of German energy security, and assesses the implications of German 
energy security strategy to overall regional security and stability.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Security of energy and security through energy have long been recognized as vital 
to national interests. The study of energy security often traces its roots back to First Lord 
of the Admiralty Winston Churchill’s decision to transition the Royal British Navy from 
coal to oil on the eve of World War I. While Britain possessed reliable—and thus 
secure—sources of coal within its borders, it would gain a decided speed advantage over 
the Germans if it transitioned its ships to the less readily available—and secure—oil 
power.1 Security of the supply of energy was thus recognized as an important and 
balancing consideration in national strategy, and energy security was thus linked with 
national security.  
Two World Wars later, the European Union (EU) was founded on the recognition 
that energy concerns are linked to security. The Schuman Plan, introduced by French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in 1950, conceived a supranational organization, the 
European Coal and Steel Community, which would pool the coal and steel production of 
the six founding countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.2 While restoring Europe to prosperity and standardizing the means of 
production were among the goals of this plan, its primary objective was to improve 
security in the region. It reasoned that, with all of the means of weapons production under 
the control of a unified high authority, war within Europe (and specifically, between 
                                                 
1 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 35 no. 2 (2006):69.  
2 “A Peaceful Europe—the Beginnings of Cooperation,” European Union, last modified October 11, 
2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en. 
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France and Germany) would be “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”3 
The plan wagered that security could be achieved through the integration and 
consolidation of energy in Europe. 
Energy has come to underpin every aspect of life in modern society. Energy is 
used in transportation, the lighting of offices and schools, cooling and heating of homes, 
the manufacture of goods, and the growth and distribution of food. As the economist E. 
F. Schumacher stated, energy is “not just another commodity, but the precondition of all 
commodities, a basic factor equal with air, water, and earth.”4 Truly, as a precondition to 
all other aspects of economy and society, securing energy carries existential import. 
Why study the energy security concerns of Germany? Since the inception of the 
Schuman Plan at the end of World War II, Germany has emerged as the central economic 
force in Europe and as a key player internationally. The German GDP, estimated at $3.46 
trillion, is the fourth largest in the world.5 Germany is seen as the sole force keeping the 
EU afloat during times of economic crisis and has enormous economic influence over the 
region and world.6 Understanding the energy concerns of Germany bears great import to 
the region and world, then. The study of German energy security is of special interest 
because of the recent policy initiatives undertaken in Germany. German efforts at 
transitioning to renewable energy sources and decisions to abandon nuclear power will 
certainly have security ramifications regionally and worldwide.  
A further significance of this research is regarding the relationship between 
energy security and overall security and stability. Is energy security a solitary objective, 
or should it be balanced with other fundamental state concerns? Where does energy 
                                                 
3 “The Schuman Declaration,” European Union, last modified January 12, 2015, http://europa.eu/
about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm. 
4 Benjamin K. Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: A 
Synthesized Approach,” Energy 36 (2011), 5343. 
5 “GDP,” World Bank, accessed November 9, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?name_desc=true. 
6 Stuart Jeffries, “Is Germany too powerful for Europe?” The Guardian, March 31, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe. 
 3
security fit amidst the broader concerns of security and stability? This question then has 
relevance not just to Germany or Europe but globally as well. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before considering German energy security, this research must establish the 
concept of energy security and how energy security relates to other factors of energy 
policy. We then consider theories on stability and security and finally survey any existing 
work on German energy security and the relationship between energy security and the 
broader security or stability question. 
1. Energy Security 
There is a sizeable body of literature regarding energy security. Considering the 
attention that energy security has received, it is surprising, however, that a unified 
understanding of energy security has yet to emerge.7 Indeed, a fair amount of literature is 
devoted simply to surveying the disparate definitions of energy security. Sovacool, for 
instance, counts 45 separate definitions of the term in his research.8 Granted, the 
definitions often contain similarities and generally include some variant of the core tenet 
of energy security: Daniel Yergin encapsulates energy security as “the availability of 
sufficient supplies at reasonable prices.”9 
Faas points out that energy security has often been conflated with security of 
supply and the availability of primary energy resources: namely, oil and natural gas.10 He 
goes on to argue that it should take a more encompassing definition, to include the supply 
chains and infrastructure built around these energy resources.  
                                                 
7 Henryk Faas, Francesco Gracceva, Gianlucca Fulli, and Marcelo Masera, “European Security—A 
European Perspective,” in Energy Security—International and Local Issues, Theoretical Perspectives, and 
Critical Energy Infrastructures, ed. Adriane Gheorghe and Liviu Muresan (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Springer, 2011), 10. 
8 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Defining, Measuring, and Exploring Energy Security,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Energy Security, ed. Benjamin K. Sovacool (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2. 
9 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security”  Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 2006), 70. 
10 Faas, “European Security—A European Perspective,” 11. 
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Others have taken more economic-based and theoretic views. Bohi and Toman, 
for instance, argue that changes in the price or availability of energy affect not only 
energy security but, more broadly, economic welfare.11 The degree to which the 
government should intervene to promote energy security, then, depends on the existence 
of externalities that the market fails to account for on its own.  
While most literature acknowledges that energy security relates to other national 
concerns, some even melds these varied issues into a broader definition of energy 
security. Bauman, for instance, defines internal policy, economics, geopolitics, and 
security policy as dimensions and contributing factors of energy security.12 Similarly, 
Sovacool et al. define energy security as “how to equitably provide available, affordable, 
reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, proactively governed and socially acceptable 
energy services to end-users.”13 While the interrelatedness of energy security with all of 
these factors is well taken, melding the concepts into one encompassing definition of 
energy security tends to muddy the term and damage preciseness.  
Energy security authors also concede that energy security and gaining energy 
security can mean different things to different countries. As Yergin points out, the 
traditional view of energy security as the availability of energy resources at affordable 
prices is primarily held by developed consumer-nations.14 Energy-exporting countries, on 
the other hand, view energy security as the security of demand: ensuring future sales and 
prices through long-term contracts. For Russia, energy security appears to entail the 
nationalizing of the energy sector and controlling energy infrastructure. Developing 
nations like China and India take energy security to mean adapting to market dependence. 
Japan, because of its paucity of resources, finds energy security in diversifying energy 
imports and managing foreign investment. European nations find energy security to mean 
                                                 
11 Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman, Economics of Energy Security (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1996), 1. 
12 Florian Baumann, “Energy Security as Multidimensional Concept”  Research Group on European 
Affairs No. 1 (2008), 4. 
13 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Ishani Mukherjee, Ira Martina Drupardy, and Anthony L. D’Agostino, 
“Evaluating Energy Security Performance from 1990 to 2010 for Eighteen Countries”  Energy 36 (2011), 
5846. 
14 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 70. 
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mitigating their dependence on natural gas, and the United States finds energy security in 
relinquishing its previous notions of energy independence.15  
Esakova highlights the temporal nature of energy security. She argues that the 
understanding of energy security changes over time, as does the attention that it receives 
in the public discourse. The subject, for instance, went from being a relatively obscure 
“dead issue” in the 1990s to a primary interest in recent times. Supply challenges of 
consumer countries have prompt a “new energy security paradigm,” and the nature of 
energy security concerns has changed.16 Whereas energy security was primarily an issue 
of military readiness in the post-World War II era of the 1950s, security of supply took 
on greater societal significance with the Arab oil embargo and oil crisis of the 1970s, and 
came to be equated with energy independence.17 In the 1980s and 1990s, Esakova points 
out that energy security took a more economic form, with countries focusing on 
protecting their economies from supply shocks. Recent changes in understanding have 
also caused energy security to encompass not only oil but also natural gas, electricity, and 
infrastructure. The changes are dependent on current events, and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, have influenced the energy security discussion, as have tensions 
with Iran, attacks to facilities in Nigeria, natural disasters like hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
and Russian-Ukrainian tensions over natural gas in 2007.18 Some even argue that conflict 
in the 21st century is defined as a war of resources, and that the quest for energy resources 
has precipitated much of the history of the era.19  
When surveying the varied definitions of energy security, this thesis seeks to 
avoid the muddiness of conflating distinct themes into one encompassing term on the one 
hand while also acknowledging the position of energy security—the availability and 
affordability of adequate energy resources—among other energy policy objectives. To 
this end, the research will adopt the view of energy policy as a trilemma: a balance 
                                                 
15 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 71. 
16 Nataliya Esakova, European Energy Security: Analysing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in 





between the competing concerns for energy security, equity, and environmental 
sustainability.20 This framework, where trade-offs between competing concerns must be 
made, and where the pursuing of two objectives often comes at the expense of the third, 
helps to illustrate the difficulty in formulating energy policy. Reliable access to energy 
can conceivably be pursued in conjunction with cheaper prices (through expanding coal 
consumption, for instance), but is likely to come with increased Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions. Pursuing a reduction in GHG while still maintaining energy affordability, on 
the other hand, will likely come at the expense of energy security (as is witnessed by 
Europe’s current reliance on Russian natural gas). Finally, while energy security and 
GHG emissions reductions can be pursued in tandem, they are likely to come at a high 
economic cost.21  
These three objectives can themselves be subdivided into further more nuanced 
ones. Environmental sustainability, for instance, encompasses the pursuit of “renewable” 
energy sources whose harvest does not exceed regeneration. It also, as mentioned, entails 
the reduction of waste emissions like GHG that have been linked to global warming. 
Finally, sustainability also encompasses increased efficiency through more energy-
efficient structures, decreases in consumption, and the use of novel approaches like load-
control and time-of-use pricing.22  
Energy equity concerns both affordability and price stability. Without stable 
prices, energy suppliers cannot accurately predict profitability and thus have difficulty 
making long-term infrastructure investments. 
Finally, energy security entails the reliability and safety of infrastructure and 
energy sources within a state, but also speaks to external supply disruptions that might 
stem from natural events or political ones. These many aspects of energy security lead to 
                                                 
20 Joan MacNaughton, “World Energy Trilemma,” World Energy Council, accessed March 18, 2016, 
https://www.worldenergy.org/work-programme/strategic-insight/assessment-of-energy-climate-change-
policy/.  
21 Robert E. Looney, “Energy Security in Western Europe,” in Europa World online, Routledge, 
accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.europaworld.com/entry/a1. 
22 Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An 
International Perspective,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Volume 35 (2010): 84, 
doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-042509-143035. 
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different ways of addressing security concerns. Energy security might be furthered, for 
instance, through technological means like improving the reliability of transmission 
systems. It might be enhanced through encouraging liberal market institutions, 
diversifying energy suppliers and sources, or security measures that guard key 
infrastructure and assets from terrorism or attack. Maintaining reserve stockpiles has been 
a central tenet of the International Energy Association’s (IEA) approach to energy 
security. Finally, energy security can be pursued through force or geopolitical 
maneuvering. 
Germany (and the EU as a whole) has favored a liberal market-centered and 
socializing approach to achieving energy security. It has sought to reproduce its own 
internal energy market rules and legal norms in the countries that it trades with through 
“deep” economic ties in order to “liberate energy supply from the control … of unstable 
elites and cartels.”23 While the agenda has been derisively referred to as “regulatory 
imperialism” or “neo-Westphalian” soft-imperialism, it nonetheless is rooted in the 
liberal tenets of international relations and the efficacy of interdependence, democracy, 
and liberal institutions in enhancing security.24 The next section will review the liberal 
theory of international relations in order to provide a basis for assessing German strategy 
with theory. 
2. International Relations Theory  
In assessing the implications of energy policy and the energy security stance of 
Germany in terms of a broader regional security objective, this research must turn to 
international relations theory and its predictions on security. The field of international 
relations can be generalized into two main bodies of theory: liberalism and realism.25 
This review turns first to realist theory. Realism itself can be further divided into three 
main schools: human nature realism, defensive (or structural realism), and offensive 
                                                 
23 Richard Youngs, Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge (New York: Routledge, 
2009), l6. 
24 Ibid., 18. 
25 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2014), 14. 
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realism. All of these schools agree on several key tenets: the state is the primary actor in 
international relations; the impetus for action lies not within the state and is not defined 
by the type of state, but rather by structural variables that exist outside of the state; and 
states are primarily concerned with power and the competition for it.26 The schools differ 
in their views on why states seek power and how aggressively they pursue it. Human 
nature realists like Hans Morgenthau believe that the quest for power is an innate 
characteristic of mankind. This desire for power is reflected in states, which have an 
insatiable “lust” for power that invariably leads to a struggle for supremacy and to 
conflict.27 In contrast, Kenneth Waltz, considered the founder of defensive realism, 
believes that structural factors are responsible for the quest for power. The anarchic 
system that defines international relations, while coming into existence through the 
individual actors of the system, itself becomes an impelling force that constrains and 
limits the behavior of the actors.28 Waltz believes that states are self-interested and have 
self-preservation and the desire to maintain autonomy as their primary interest.29 Waltz 
does not see aggression as inherent in the system, as the desire for self-preservation leads 
to defensive strategies on the part of states. John Mearsheimer, the originator of offensive 
realism, disagrees. He argues that states are not happy with a status quo, but rather 
constantly seek more power in order to improve their security equation.30  
Herein we can see realist predictions on the state of international relations. Both 
offensive realists and human nature realists provide a gloomy outlook destined to be rife 
with conflict. Even Waltz, a defensive realist, sees the recurrence of war as symptomatic, 
as great powers seek to balance one another.31  
Realist theory has limited predictive value, as it provides no prescriptions for 
effecting change in international relations. The causal agents for the bleak world outlook 
                                                 
26 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, 18. 
27 Ibid., 19. 
28 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979), 102. 
29 Ibid., 113. 
30 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, 21. 
31 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70, 204. 
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cannot be manipulated, and are either inherent in human nature or endemic in the system. 
While Waltz and Mearsheimer do describe circumstances that are relatively more stable, 
stability is dependent on systemic characteristics that are difficult to alter. Both assert, for 
instance, that bipolar worlds are more stable than multipolar worlds; even the Soviet 
Union contributed to security while it was in existence by managing its sphere of 
influence.32 Achieving such a bipolar world, however, invariably involves conflict, and 
the balancing between the two great powers of the world will similarly still generate 
occasional conflict.  
This research thus turns to liberal theory for guidance. Liberal theory does not 
postulate inherent and inexorable systemic tendencies, but even provides prescriptions for 
effecting improvements to security in world affairs. Our decision to use liberal theory as 
the basis for assessing security is also couched in the fact that Germany (and the EU) has 
largely adopted a liberal view of international relations. Not only was the EU formed 
along liberal notions of the efficacy of Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and the 
stabilizing force of democracy, but the EU has seen itself as a promoter of liberal norms, 
better governance, and protection of human rights abroad.33 To this end, it has attempted 
to liberalize, or “Europeanize,” the markets of its trading partners, developing a “deep 
trade agenda that [seeks] to address ‘behind-the-border’ issues in …non-European 
states.”34 Assessing security predictions based on liberal theory, then, would have the 
added advantage of serving as a “report card” on how well Germany and the other EU 
countries have done at their liberalizing objectives. The next section provides a review of 
liberal theory and its predictions and prescriptions for security, as encapsulated in Bruce 
Russett and John Oneal’s book, Triangulating Peace. 
                                                 
32 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 161. 
33 Youngs, Energy Security-Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, 44. 
34 Ibid. 
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3. Liberal Security Theory  
The tenets of the liberal theory that the EU’s market approach is derived from are 
encapsulated in Bruce Russett and John Oneal’s Triangulating Peace.35 The book 
provides a systematic study of the correlations between democracy, intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), economic interdependence, and peace. It begins with the 
observation that democracies do not fight, develops a theory that is rooted in Kant’s 
seminal work Perpetual Peace, and tests the theory with a rigorous quantitative model 
built on 40,000 data points.36 Russett and Oneal’s work makes a bold conclusion that 
democracy, IGOs, and economic interdependence work together to reduce the likelihood 
of conflict. These variables, they indicate, strengthen each other and form virtuous circles 
that benefit even states outside the circles with relative peace.37  
Liberal theory avers that form of government matters. Democracies gain their 
legitimacy from the people they serve and are more accountable to them. They maintain a 
system of checks and balances that prevent players from acting unilaterally. They exhibit 
a higher degree of transparency than their autocratic counterparts and thus do a better job 
at signaling intent to other international players. Transparency also makes them more 
trustworthy trade partners. Finally, democracies are more sensitive to human rights and to 
the costs of violence. All of these characteristics—both structural and cultural—act to 
make democracies more stable business partners and more secure.38 
Liberal theory also touts the benefits of economic interdependence in promoting 
stability and security. High levels of interconnection increase the cost of conflict for all 
powers, even the stronger ones. Trade promotes development of international laws and 
organizations that constrain all participants.39 Liberal theorists also point to the benefits 
of increased communication that are brought about by international trade; trade exposes 
                                                 
35Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International 
Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 179. 





citizens to perspectives of those living in other countries and promotes cross-cultural 
understanding.40 According to liberal theory, “economic interdependence contributes to 
the construction of a ‘security community’” and a common sense of identity.41 
Finally, liberal theory also explains the role of IGOs in peace and stability. IGOs 
help to arbitrate conflicts and dissuade rule-breakers.42 They support the creation of 
norms and of cooperation and coordination among members. In this sense, IGOs have a 
socializing function that spreads liberal and democratic ideals. 
4. German Energy Security 
a.  German Energy mix 
There is little debate with regard to the current energy mix in Germany; data can 
be easily obtained from intergovernmental agencies like the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), private associations like the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen, or from state 
entities like the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.43 AG 
Energiebilanzen, for instance, reports the primary energy consumption in Germany for 
the year 2015, as is noted in Figure 1. Trends are also readily available; Figure 2 from the 
IEA compares 2013 energy supply to previous years.  
Similarly, German energy policy and strategy can be ascertained through several 
sources. The Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy publishes a comprehensive 
strategy for energy.44 Its ten-point agenda, among other things, stresses the transition to 
more environmentally friendly and renewable energy sources, the strengthening of power 
grids, improved energy efficiency, and measures to ensure security of supply.  
                                                 
40 Ibid., 130. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 163. 
43 “Germany,” International Energy Agency, accessed November 9, 2016, https://www.iea.org; 
“Mediathek,” Bundesministerium Fur Wirtschaft und Energie, accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://www.bmwi.de; “Daten und Fakten,” AG Energiebilanzen, accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de. 
44 “Energy of the Future,” Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, accessed November 10, 
2016, http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Energy-Transition/overall-strategy.html. 
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One can also gain insight into Germany’s energy policy by consulting EU 
Commission agenda during the last German EU term of presidency at the beginning of 
2007. As Umbach explains, the agenda set before the EU during this presidency 
emphasized energy security and climate change. The Energy Action Plan agreed upon in 
March of 2007 included steps to further liberalize gas and electricity markets, formulate a 
unified external energy policy, and ensure security of supply.45  
Finally, the German Bundestag publishes press releases that explain their policies. 
Among other things, the Bundestag has used press releases to respond to criticism 
regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, affirming that the pipeline acts to promote 
energy security, is primarily a commercial venture, and does not violate EU sanctions or 
diversification goals.46 
                                                 
45 Frank Umbach, “German Debates on Energy Security and Impacts on Germany’s 2007 EU 
Presidency,” in Energy Security—Visions from Asia and Europe, ed. Antonio Marquina (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), 4. 




Figure 1.  2016 Total German Primary Energy Consumption47 
 
 
Figure 2.  Total German Energy Supply48  
                                                 
47 Adapted from “AG Energiebilanzen Pressedienst 2016 no. 1,” AGEB, March 18, 2016, 
http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/.  
48 Source: “IEA Germany One-Pager,” IEA, June 2014, https://www.iea.org/media/countries/slt/
GermanyOnepagerJune2014.pdf.  
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b. German Energy Security 
Debate does exist regarding what impacts German energy policy has to energy 
security and overall German stability. Many articles laud Germany’s Energiewende and a 
successful transition to renewable and environmentally friendly energy sources.49 
Others, however, point to increasing dependence on fossil fuel imports, a 
struggling traditional base power industry, the questionable viability of renewables in 
Germany, and rising energy costs.50 These views will be considered in the body of this 
thesis. 
5. Energy Security and Security 
While energy security literature often treats energy security as an objective that is 
interlinked with efficiency and affordability, it rarely addresses the implications of energy 
security to broader security objectives or international relations theory. Looney describes 
virtuous trilemmas, where national security is incorporated as an objective to energy 
policy. He outlines the negative ramifications for climate change on national security, and 
the benefits of national policy that is less clouded by energy security motivations.51  
Esakova incorporates international relations theory into her analysis of energy 
security, and applies the work of Keohane and Nye to the oil and gas markets. She argues 
                                                 
49 Sang-Chul Park and Dieter Eissel, “Alternative Energy Policies in Germany with Particular 
Reference to Solar Energy,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18, no. 3 (2010): 323; Rolf 
Wustenhagen and Michael Bilharz, “Green Energy Market Development in Germany: Effective Public 
policy and emerging customer demand,” Energy Policy 34 (2006): 1681; Lutz Mez, “Germany’s Merger of 
Energy and Climate Change Policy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 6 (2015): 22. 
50 Ed Crooks, “Germans in Energy Scramble,” Financial Times, January 13, 2010; Alice Bota, 
Matthias Krupa, and Michael Thumann, “Die Rohrbombe,” Zeit Online, February 5, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/2016/06/nord-stream-2-deutschland-russland-pipeline/komplettansicht; Warren Dym, 
“A Tale of Three Pipelines: Nord Stream and the Primacy of Industry in Germany,” Big Deal Energy 
(blog), September 26, 2015, http://warrendym.com/a-tale-of-three-pipelines-nord-stream-in-context/; 
“Europe’s Gas Pipelines: The Abominable Gas Man,” The Economist, October 14, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17260657.  
51 Robert E. Looney, “United States’ Energy and Climate Transition: Partial Success Without a Plan,” 
in Routledge Handbook on Transitions to Climate and Energy Security, ed. Robert E Looney, 25. 
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for the applicability of interdependence theory in these markets, and uses it to explain 
differences in energy relationships.52  
Sovacool elucidates on the ways in which energy security affects the overall 
security equation. He provides examples where there was either a perceived or overt 
coercion through energy resources, and cites a Stanford study that refers to natural gas as 
the “gas weapon” because of its frequent use in manipulation.53 He points to China’s 
1992 statement on its willingness to use force to assert its rights over oil and gas 
resources in the South China Sea, and even provides examples for how the quest to 
secure energy resources contributed to both World Wars and conflict during the Cold 
War.54 Here he echoes historian Vaclav Smil, who argues that energy was related to 
almost every cross-border war in the 20th century. Sovacool goes further to connect 
energy and war, explaining how war is the most “concentrated and devastating” release 
of energy, requires the mobilization of energy resources, and often results in the 
disruption of energy.55  
The aforementioned examples notwithstanding, current energy security literature 
fails to assess energy security principles of strategy against international relations or to 
make predictions on how these strategies will affect overall security. This thesis, in 
studying German energy policy and energy security concerns, will use liberal 
international relations theory to explore any relationships that may exist between energy 
security and overall security. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis now continues by investigating three notable topics in the German 
energy mix: the proposed trans-Baltic natural gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany, 
the Nord Stream 2; Germany’s decision to phase-out nuclear energy; and German and EU 
efforts to transition to renewable and green energies. The three are major issues in 
                                                 
52 Esakova, European Energy Security—Analysing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms 
of Interdependence Theory, 19. 




German energy policy and represent points of departure or transitions in German 
strategy. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline plan is controversial and appears to be inconsistent 
with EU policy, but it also highlights a consistent (and perhaps growing) trend of German 
reliance on natural gas imports. Germany’s decision to abandon nuclear technology as a 
component of national energy supply is similarly controversial. It too has ramifications 
on German energy independence and thus security, and is also perceived to affect 
Germany’s chances of succeeding with its Energiewende, or transition to renewable 
energies. Finally, the German (and EU) transition to renewable energy sources is a 
landmark event that carries significant implications to energy security. Germany stands as 
a pioneer of the move to renewable energies, and its success or failure has enduring 
implications to energy policies worldwide. The thesis will devote a chapter to each 
theme; it will introduce the theme, establish its significance, and assess its implications 
on German energy security and regional security and stability. The thesis will conclude 
by providing a consolidated outlook on German energy security and regional security and 
stability and will reiterate significant observations from the previous chapters.  
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II. NORD STREAM 2 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nord Stream 2 AG, a consortium of five European companies and the Russian 
energy giant Gazprom, launched in November of 2015 with the goal of expanding the 
current Nord Stream natural gas pipeline.56 The proposal will add two pipes spanning the 
Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany and will effectively double the output of the 
existing Nord Stream infrastructure that became operational in 2011.  
The vocal criticism from certain European countries belies the apparent 
inclusiveness of the multinational venture. Shortly after announcement of Nord Stream 
2’s formation, ten EU nations submitted a letter to the European Commission that advised 
that the pipeline was contrary to EU interests and called for its further scrutiny.57 The 
plan, at any rate, appears to fly in the face of EU sanctions against Gazprom that are still 
in place since Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
In the face of such strong objection on the part of elements in the EU and at the 
risk of compromising the cohesiveness of EU international policy, why is Germany 
continuing to support construction of this pipeline? Why was the pipeline proposed in the 
first place? Who are the major stakeholders, what are their interests, and what will the 
overall effect be on German energy security and security as a whole for the region? This 
chapter considers the positions of the main stakeholders in this venture and assesses the 
effects of Nord Stream 2 on energy security in Germany and regional security in general. 
Specifically, it argues that while Nord Stream 2 is expected to increase energy security 
for Germany, its effects on regional security and stability are not as clear. The Nord 
Stream case reveals conflicts between energy security strategies and overall security 
interests. The chapter provides a brief overview of the Nord Stream project, elucidates 
                                                 
56 “Nord Stream 2,” Nord Stream 2, accessed January 31, 2016, http://www.nord-stream2.com/. 
57 Barbara Lewis, “Ten EU Nations Say Nord Stream Gas Extension Not in EU Interests,” Reuters, 
November 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nordstream-
idUSKBN0TG0JX20151127. 
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the positions of the main stakeholders, and assesses the effects of Nord Stream on energy 
security and overall security using the previously laid out principles. 
B. HISTORY 
As mentioned earlier, the envisioned Nord Stream 2 pipeline is an extension to the 
Nord Stream (1) pipeline, which was built by a consortium of five shareholders: the 
Russian Gazprom, German companies Wintershall (a subsidiary of BASF) and E.ON, 
Dutch Gasunie, and French Suez.58 The consortium was founded in 2005 and began 
construction in April 2010. The project consists of two 1,224 km strings that originate 
near the Russian Baltic city of Vyborg and terminate near the German coastal city of 
Greifswald.59 The first string came online in November 2011 and the second string was 
commissioned less than one year later in October 2012. The two existing strings have a 
capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year and cost 7.4 billion euros to 
construct. 
According to Gazprom, Nord Stream shareholders were already assessing the 
viability of an expansion to the newly built pipeline in 2012. The proposed routes largely 
follow those taken by the original pipeline, and the Nord Stream 2 consortium hopes to 
use the original infrastructure as a benchmark for the proposed expansion.60 The 
proposed expansion would add 55 bcm and effectively double capacity. The next section 
assesses the major stakeholders in the Nord Stream 2 project. 
C. THE MAJOR PLAYERS  
1. Russia 
Despite being an expansion to an existing pipeline, Nord Stream 2 is nonetheless 
expected to cost 9.9 billion euros—over one billion euros more than its predecessor.61 
                                                 
58 “Nord Stream,” Nord Stream, accessed January 31, 2016, http://www.nord-stream.com/. 
59 “Nord Stream,” Gazprom, accessed January 31, 2016, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/
projects/pipelines/nord-stream/. 
60 “About Us,” Nord Stream, accessed January 31, 2016, http://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/. 
61 Agata Loskot-Strachota, “The Case Against Nord Stream 2,” Energy Post, November 23, 2015, 
http://www.energypost.eu/case-nord-stream-2/. 
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Total Russian gas export to Europe in 2014 was 147 bcm—roughly half the capacity of 
current pipelines to Europe and Turkey (307 bcm).62 Why would Russia undertake this 
costly endeavor when ample capacity already exists?  
The impetus lies in Ukraine’s current status as a transit state for Russian gas; 
much Russian gas that is destined for Europe currently flows through Ukraine. Gazprom 
and the Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz have seen a rash of disputes over gas supply 
starting from the mid-2000s. The disputes culminated in Gazprom’s cutting Ukrainian 
gas supplies in 2006 and 2009. Ukraine responded by siphoning gas that was destined for 
Europe, causing European customers to witness significant drops in supply. The episodes 
caused an outcry from Western European customers, and Gazprom was compelled to 
resume supply.  
These gas disputes have led Gazprom to diversify its supply routes to Europe, and 
were the impetus for both Nord Stream and the since-discontinued South Stream 
pipelines.63 Nord Stream has reduced Gazprom reliance on Ukraine as a transit state. The 
Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that the amount of Russian natural gas transiting 
its country has decreased by 28% in recent years.64 While a significant portion of this can 
be attributed to the ongoing tensions between the two countries, Russia’s continued 
ability to supply Europe in spite of these reductions is due in part to Nord Stream 1, and 
Nord Stream 2 will further reduce Russian reliance on Ukraine as a transit state. 
A separate Russian incentive for the Nord Stream pipeline is the desire to better 
focus gas exports to Europe. The Ukrainian Corridor transits Slovakia onward to Austria, 
Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia.65 A component of the Ukrainian corridor also transits south 
toward Romania and Moldova. Nord Stream allows Gazprom to direct more gas toward 
northern Europe and onward to the UK. Germany is the largest gas importer in Europe, 
                                                 
62 “Gazprom Annual Corporate Brochure,” Gazprom, 2014, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/
presscenter/publications/#brochure. 
63 “How the Game Is Played: The Life and Death of South Stream,” Stratfor, September 17, 2015, 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-game-played-life-and-death-south-stream. 
64 “Ukraine,” Energy Information Agency, last updated September 2015, http://www.eia.gov/beta/
international/analysis.cfm?iso=UKR. 
65 Loskot-Strachota, “Case Against Nord Stream 2.”  
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importing 86 bcm in 2014, and the UK is fourth, importing 42 bcm.66 Increased capacity 
to this region is advantageous in light of expectations that gas production in Norway and 
the Netherlands will decline.67 
2. Germany 
a. Demand  
As mentioned earlier, Germany is Europe’s largest natural gas importer. It 
receives its gas from Russia (38%), Norway (22%), and the Netherlands (26%).68 The 
natural gas consumption in Germany is entrenched; Germany first imported gas from the 
USSR in 1973 and completed an underwater pipeline to import Norwegian gas in 1977.69 
While Germany has undertaken an ambitious Energiewende program to increase the 
share of renewable energies, its dependence on natural gas is not likely to decline in the 
near term. German and EU environmental legislation has set emissions reduction targets 
for 2020 and beyond. Because natural gas produces roughly 40% of the carbon dioxide 
emissions of coal (it is thus known as a bridge fuel), it is likely to be favored over coal in 
the energy mix, and will likely play a large role in replacing the supply lost through the 
planned retirement of all of Germany’s nuclear plants by 2022.70 Liberalization of the 
energy market, another objective of EU energy policy, has also tended to favor natural 
gas, as the market favors the relatively low-cost gas to other long-term investment.71 
Finally, natural gas power plants can be switched from idle to high production in a 
                                                 
66 “International Energy Statistics,” EIA, accessed March 19, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/
ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=26&aid=4. 
67 “Historical and expected volumes of sales gas from Norwegian fields, 1985–2025,” Norwegian 
Petroleum, data published 2014, http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/?attachment_id=10939. 
68 “Natural Gas Supply in Germany,” Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, accessed 
March 19, 2016, http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Conventional-energy-sources/gas.html. 
69 John S. Duffield, Fuels Paradise: Seeking Energy Security for Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2015), 163. 
70 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Germany (Paris: IEA, 2013), 52; 
“Nord Stream Environmental Impact Assessment: Documentation for Consultation under the Espoo 
Convention,” Nord Stream, February 2009, https://www.nord-stream.com/download/document/
69/?language=en. 
71 Paul Belkin and Vince L. Morelli, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges (CRS Report 
No. RL33636) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 20. 
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relatively short time. Quick modulation supports the role of natural gas alongside 
renewable energies, which themselves tend to be cyclical (rising and falling with the sun 
and wind).72  
With expectations that gas production will decline in Norway and the 
Netherlands, it is in Germany’s interests to ensure the reliability of its Russian source. 
Russian gas is currently supplied via the Yamal pipeline that flows from Poland (via 
Belarus) and the Ukrainian Corridor network that runs from the Czech Republic (via 
Slovakia and Ukraine).73 Diversifying supply routes, even if the source remains the same, 
would be advantageous, especially considering the disruptions caused by Ukrainian-
Russian disputes.74 
b. Politics 
Of the German political parties, the SPD is often labeled as being pro-Russian.75 
Gerhard Schroeder, leader of the SPD and Chancellor during its coalition with the Greens 
from 1998–2005, favored a policy of Ostpolitik and was instrumental in supporting the 
early negotiations for Nord Stream. Likewise, current Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Energy and SPD member Sigmar Gabriel is seen as a strong defender of Russian ties and 
supports Nord Stream 2.76 It must be said, however, that he works in a coalition 
government with the stronger CDU/CSU. The center-right CDU/CSU has been in power 
since 2005, and must also claim responsibility for Nord Stream, as it oversaw the 
commissioning of Nord Stream 1 and negotiations for Nord Stream 2. While the leader of 
the CDU, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and others in her party have taken a more critical 
                                                 
72 Sören Amelang, “Germany’s dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Clean Energy Wire, February 
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view of Russia, she has nonetheless backed the proposal, reasserting on several occasions 
that it is a business decision.77 Similarly, the Bundestag announcement regarding Nord 
Stream also calls it a business decision and principally supports any diversification of 
energy supply.78 Thus, while it might be argued that German policy toward Nord Stream 2 
was politically influenced, the two major parties, which enjoy roughly 80% of Bundestag 
representation, have both at least tacitly approved of the plan. Of note, former Chancellor 
Schroeder accepted a job on the board of Nord Stream AG shortly after stepping down 
from his office in 2005. He has been strongly criticized over a conflict of interest.79 Finally, 
the judiciary has also supported Russian business arrangements, and the German anti-
monopoly court approved Gazprom acquiring a stake in German energy-sector firms VNG 
and Wingas.80  
c. Business Interests 
Two of the members of the Nord Stream 2 consortium, E.on and BASF 
Wintershall, are German companies. While the pipeline does give the companies access 
to cheaper gas by avoiding transit countries, the primary interest in the project is likely 
the reciprocal deals that are associated with it. European companies have long sought 
access to Russian gas fields. The Yuzhno Russkoye Field, one of the world’s largest oil 
and gas fields, is the source for much of Nord Stream gas, and E.on and Wintershall each 
acquired a 25% stake in the production license and operations company.81 
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The degree to which business interests affect national policy in Germany cannot 
be completely ascertained. Special interests—especially from the energy sector—are said 
to have strong ties to the federal government, with energy companies enjoying close 
relationships with the Ministry of Economics. Friedemann Müller, a prominent energy 
analyst, has observed that the Ministry of Economics has been almost unreservedly 
committed to supporting German business interests.82  
3. Eastern European States 
Response to the Nord Stream 2 proposal has been overwhelmingly negative 
among the Eastern European states. EU members like Poland and Slovakia contest that 
the project contradicts EU energy law but also have personal interests at stake. Both 
nations are transit states for Russian natural gas—Poland hosts the Yamal pipeline and 
Slovakia the Bratstvo pipeline that also passes Ukraine—and stand to lose revenues if 
Russia diverts gas supplies to Nord Stream.83 Of the 10 nations that signed a letter 
questioning the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the majority are transit states, and all are heavily 
dependent on Russian gas imports.  
This highlights another concern in the region: dependency on Russia for natural 
gas. According to a 2013 Gazprom-BP statistical review, 10 Eastern European countries 
import at least 60% of their national gas supply from Russia, and four—Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, and Lithuania—are completely dependent on Russia for their gas needs.84 Russia 
has traditionally capitalized on the high levels of dependence and energy isolation of 
these Eastern European countries by engaging in price-discrimination and other 
monopolistic practices.85 Any reductions in gas transiting Eastern Europe, it is feared, 
will further isolate the region and make it subject to Russian manipulation. Radek 
Sikorski, then Polish foreign minister, even compared the Nord Stream agreement 
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 24
between Russia and Germany to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.86 Finally, Italy also 
has expressed opposition to Nord Stream 2. Though it is less dependent on Russian 
natural gas than Germany, it decried a perceived double standard within the EU.87 The 
pipeline that it had been negotiating with Russia, South Stream, encountered numerous 
obstacles within the EU and was ultimately abandoned.  
4. The European Union 
The 2006 and 2009 gas disputes and the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis elevated 
the importance of energy security within the EU. Security of natural gas supply is of 
particular concern; even though EU states import more oil (90%) than they do natural gas 
(60%), gas supply is perceived to be less secure due to the relatively few sources for gas 
and the complete dependence of some EU countries on Russian natural gas.88  
In response to the crises, the EU Commission released an Energy Security 
Strategy (ESS) in 2014. The strategy included a series of “stress tests” to assess European 
resilience to Russian supply shocks ranging from one to six months.  
The ESS also proposed five long-term solutions to EU gas dependency: 
increasing energy efficiency, increasing internal energy production (to include nuclear, 
sustainable fossil fuels, and renewable energies), completing the internal energy market, 
unifying external energy policy, and strengthening emergency plans.89  
The goal to institute an internal energy market has been long-standing, and has 
included market liberalization measures such as those found in the EU Third Energy 
Package. The package requires the “unbundling” of energy suppliers from corporations 
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that operate energy infrastructure, prohibits monopolies, and requires third party access to 
infrastructure.90  
The Commission recognized the importance of cohesion in the EU and that 
bilateral agreements negotiated by EU and non-EU countries could undermine EU 
strategy. To this end the ESS strengthened existing requirements for countries to report 
energy agreements (Intergovernmental Agreements, or IGAs) to the EU commission. 
While reporting requirements had already been in place since 2012, they were deemed as 
ineffective, as a study assessed that roughly one third of IGAs were not consistent with 
EU law and none had been successfully amended.91  
That said, the Commission has demonstrated its strength at enforcing compliance 
with Third Energy Package market rules. Gazprom’s plans to build the South Stream 
Pipeline connecting Russia to Europe via the Black Sea met stiff resistance in the EU, 
which found it in violation of Third Package requirements and began to investigate 
Gazprom over monopolistic practices.92 Consequent to this investigation and general 
European backlash regarding the Ukrainian crisis, Russia abandoned the South Stream 
project in December 2014.93 
Interestingly, the Nord Stream proposal, which was pursued during the same time 
period, did not receive the same scrutiny and instead was granted immunity from Third 
Package requirements through a designation as a Trans-European Network (TEN) 
pipeline.94  
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While the Commission still acknowledges overdependence on Russian gas 
imports—”we are still far too vulnerable,” asserted European Commissioner for Climate 
Action and Energy Miguel Arias Canete—it seems to be taking the same approach to the 
expansion of the Nord Stream pipeline as it did to the original, and has echoed Chancellor 
Merkel’s claims that Nord Stream 2 is a “commercial venture.”95 Still, it is reviewing 
Ukrainian complaints regarding the expansion and affirms that it will assess “the legal 
position” of the project.96 
D. EFFECTS 
The success of the Nord Stream 2 project is contingent on geopolitical 
developments and the consortium’s ability to navigate the approval of Baltic countries, 
maintain backing within the German political system, and pass Eastern European and EU 
scrutiny. As it were, the Commission is currently reviewing a complaint from Ukrainian 
energy company Naftogaz.97 Assuming the status quo, however, Nord Stream 2 is likely 
to pass the hurdles as its predecessor did. This section will assess the effects on energy 
security and overall security if Nord Stream 2 comes to fruition.  
1. Energy Security 
According to the tenets of energy security discussed earlier, Nord Stream 2 is 
expected to improve energy security for Germany. Even though the pipeline does not 
diversify gas supply, it does diversify supply routes. It not only protects Germany from 
supply interruptions that could come from the aging existing infrastructure, but it also 
disassociates German gas imports from political and business disputes between Ukraine 
and Russia. This benefit would be offset if the pipeline tied Germany to contracts that 
further increase its dependence on Russian gas, but this is unlikely, especially since 
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Gazprom has agreed to sell its gas on the spot market.98 Benefits of supply diversity 
would also be offset if Gazprom acts on its previously stated intention to halt gas transit 
through Ukraine by 2019.99 
2. Security 
a. Eastern European Stability 
While Nord Stream 2 should act to improve energy security for Germany, it 
promises to decrease overall security for Germany and the region. This is largely because 
of its possible effects on Eastern Europe. With a combined capacity of 110 bcm, the 
resulting Nord Stream pipeline would be able to completely displace Ukrainian transit 
gas, which amounted to roughly 80 bcm in 2013.100 If Russia acts on its earlier intention 
to halt Ukrainian transit gas, Ukraine can stand to lose 2 billion euros in royalties. This 
will further damage an already fragile economic and political situation in Ukraine, and 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has called the pipeline “anti-Ukrainian.”101 
Perhaps more damaging would be Russia’s ability to use gas as a hard power tool 
against Ukraine. Although it has already been perceived to do so in the earlier gas 
stoppages, Russia was limited by the political backlash from Western Europe. With no 
dependence on Ukrainian transit gas, Western Europe is less likely to respond to Russian 
manipulation of gas exports to Ukraine, giving Russia freer rein to use gas supply as a 
hard power tool. Gas dependence on Russia has already been perceived to stifle Western 
criticism of Russian antagonistic behavior toward its neighbors.102 Direct Russian-
German relations have isolated Eastern Europeans and made them reminiscence on the 
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Motolov-Ribbentrop pact of World War II.103 Further isolation is likely to propagate the 
perception of Eastern Europe as a “shatter belt” between Russia and Germany.104 
Economic or political crises in Central Europe will likely have spill-over effects 
for Germany and the rest of Western Europe as will Russian aggression on its neighbors, 
and these will act to reduce regional security. According to the liberal model described 
earlier, reduced interdependence between Germany and its eastern neighbors, coupled 
with a sense of abandonment, could increase the likelihood of conflict between these two 
parties. 
b. Direct German-Russian Ties 
In contrast, Nord Stream 2 will deepen ties between Germany and Russia and 
reinforce German Ostpolitik. This comes at a time when Russian and Western relations 
have been strained, with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev even calling the situation 
emblematic of a “new Cold War.”105 According to liberal theory, the increased 
interdependence should act to reduce conflict between Germany and Russia and thereby 
improve security between Russia and the West. German-Russian interdependence will be 
heightened by German commercial stakes in Russian gas fields. These inroads might act 
to liberalize the traditionally closed Russian market, and theory predicts that liberal 
democratic countries are less prone to conflict.  
There is contention as to whether resource-focused trade is beneficial for national 
economies or whether resource-driven relationships truly improve security.106 Some 
argue that large resource reserves like those in Russia crowd out other sectors of a 
nation’s economy. They assert that other sectors contribute more to jobs and 
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development, and thus a large resource market causes more harm than good. 
Furthermore, it is argued that resource endowments and resource-dependent trade have 
been detrimental to democracy in Russia.107 A decrease in democracy, according to 
liberal theory, is expected to increase the likelihood of conflict between Russia and other 
countries, and would thus reduce security in the area.  
c. National Interests Versus a Collective EU Identity 
Liberal theory posits that Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) like the EU are 
stabilizing and thus improve security. Indeed, the period of post-WWII peace in Western 
Europe has been attributed to the EU, and the Nobel Committee even awarded the EU 
with its Peace Prize in 2012 for its contributions in transforming Europe into a “continent 
of peace.”108 While the EU has introduced mechanisms to oversee energy deals like Nord 
Stream 2, bilateral deals have been perceived as a Russian attempt to “divide and 
conquer” and unravel EU cohesion.109 To the extent that bilateral deals like Nord Stream 
2 undermine EU cohesion and damage EU ability to arbitrate energy decisions, they 
could reduce security in the region.  
Bilateral agreements and the EU’s perceived inconsistent handling of them (vis-à-
vis Italy and South Stream) have acted to expose rifts within the EU. Nord Stream 2, in 
particular, has exposed the disparate interests of the Eastern European member states and 
Germany. If the pipeline project continues to polarize the EU members, this too will 
reduce security according to liberal theory. 
3. Energy Security and Security 
The previous section has outlined a few ways in which Nord Stream 2, while 
increasing German energy security, might decrease overall security. This section 
addresses a general conflict between energy security and security. As mentioned, energy 
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security theory promotes the use of domestic energy sources as a means of increasing 
energy security. To this end, the ESS promotes the increased use of renewable energies to 
reduce dependence on natural gas imports. Measures like this one to increase energy self-
sufficiency necessarily damage interdependence among countries, however, and thus act 
to increase the likelihood of conflict according to liberal IR theory. The measures are 
consistent with the tendency of nations to seek self-reliance during times of war, and lead 
to a situation where the costs of conflict are reduced.110 They also resemble self-help 
strategies that are emblematic of realist IR theory, which tends to predict conflict as a 
general state of affairs.111 As Russett and Oneal point out in their book, liberal or realist 
influences can prevail depending on the relative state of international affairs.112 
Adherence by countries to energy security tenets and other realist strategies, then, could 
shift world climate in a way that promotes realist outcomes. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding Chancellor Merkel’s claims, the Nord Stream 2 project has 
triggered political tension since its inception. The successful construction of the pipeline 
will depend on the Nord Stream consortium’s ability to navigate all of the stakeholders, 
including its opponents within the EU and Eastern Europe. If implemented, the pipeline 
will have significant implications for German and regional security and stability. While it 
might improve energy security for Germany, the overall impact on regional security is 
less clear. Further isolation of Eastern Europe promises to damage the economic and 
political situation there. Greater interdependence between Germany and Russia can 
improve Russia-Western relations and promote liberalization in Russia. Finally, bilateral 
deals like Nord Stream 2 undermine the EU energy strategy and demonstrate the limits of 
IGOs in managing traditionally national prerogatives. What effect Nord Stream 2 will 
have on regional security has yet to be seen, and this uncertain outcome highlights the 
complex relationship between energy security and overall security in general.  
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III. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 2011, the German government decided to eliminate nuclear energy 
from the German energy mix, opting to shutter eight reactors immediately and 
committing to close nine remaining reactors by 2022. This phase-out plan constitutes a 
significant—and costly—policy shift for Germany. Nuclear energy has been an integral 
part of the German energy mix since the first Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) went online in 
1968; 17 NPPs were providing for roughly 20% of the nation’s electricity needs when the 
decision was made in 2011, and nuclear energy produced close to 30% of total output at 
its height in the 1990s.113  
This is not to say that public opinion of nuclear energy has always been positive, 
and Germany is home to a long-standing and successful anti-nuclear grassroots 
movement. Furthermore, while the phase-out was obviously influenced by the nuclear 
catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, two months earlier, it was set in motion much earlier. 
To be sure, the turnaround was actually a return to a previous phase-out plan agreed to by 
the then Red-Green governing coalition in 2002.  
A thorough understanding of the context for the policy shift must thus include the 
origins of the German anti-nuclear energy movement, the consequent formation of the 
Green Party, and its development into a mainstream German political party and member 
of a coalition government. To be sure, anti-nuclear energy sentiments can be traced even 
further to the anti-nuclear weapons debate and German postwar political culture. This 
chapter traces the history—working backwards from Fukushima—of the anti-nuclear 
movement in Germany and compares German nuclear energy policy with that of its 
neighbors. It assesses the German Green Party’s ascent from fringe movement to 
established party, and considers reasons for the party’s success at affecting public policy. 
From this historical review, the chapter will make an assessment on the likelihood of 
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reinstating nuclear energy in Germany, and will then turn to the implications that the 
shuttering of nuclear power plants will have on German energy security as well as 
regional security. 
B. ORIGINS OF ANTI-NUCLEAR SENTIMENT 
1. Fukushima and Near-term Elections 
While the nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant was not the sole 
cause for Germany’s decision to phase out its nuclear energy operations, it certainly sped 
up the process. At the time of the accident, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition led by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel had just ratified the 11th amendment of the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA), extending the life of pre-1980 reactors by eight years and that of post-1980 
reactors by 14 years.114 Nuclear power was to be a bridge to a low-carbon future based 
on renewable energy, and extending the life of the reactors was expected to generate 
somewhere between 21 and 73 billion euros in additional profits from the plants.115  
It must be said that the CDU/CSU-FDP-ratified amendment undid the 
compromise of the previous government led by a SPD-Green coalition, which limited the 
lifetimes of Germany’s existing nuclear reactors in view of an eventual phase-out of 
nuclear energy. The public thus chafed at this unraveling of the long-negotiated SPD-
Green compromise, and the CDU-FDP government suffered in terms of public approval 
ratings.  
This, then, was the context of Chancellor Merkel’s response to Fukushima. 
Following the accident, Merkel announced a three-month moratorium on nuclear power, 
an immediate decommissioning of seven pre-1980 plants, and a safety inspection on all 
remaining nuclear plants. In spite of the fact that the reactor safety commission, headed 
by former Environmental Minister Klaus Toepfer, determined that all plants were safe, it 
recommended the closure of the remaining nuclear plants within a decade.116 A plan to 
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shutter all remaining plants by 2022 and effectively reinstate the SPD-Green compromise 
was put before the Bundestag and passed with 80% of the votes, and in August 2011 the 
13th amendment of the AEA was ratified. 
Acknowledgement of the efficacy of the Fukushima accident in prompting policy 
change in Germany must be framed by the fact that elections were to take place in three 
Bundesländer just two weeks after the accident. Research indicates that the nuclear issue, 
like most others, suffers from the rise and fall of a short public issue life-cycle, and the 
recency of an event affects the public’s memory of it. Recent events are thus fresher in 
the collective public memory and more apt to affect voting decisions and policy.117 
Chancellor Merkel was compelled to respond strongly to the Fukushima accident both 
because of the public’s negative reaction to her previous policy reversal and in order to 
shore up public support in view of the upcoming elections. As it turns out, the measure 
was too-little-too-late, and the CDU and SPD suffered in the regional elections.  
The significance of the public issue life-cycle and near-term elections following 
the catastrophe is supported when Germany’s policy response is compared to that of the 
United Kingdom, where there were no impending elections, and poor public opinion of 
nuclear energy did not effectuate a similar change in policy.118 
2. The Green Party and the History of the Anti-Nuclear Movement 
a. Nuclear Phase-Out Compromise 
As mentioned, the German government under Chancellor Merkel’s leadership had 
in 2010 reversed an earlier phase-out of nuclear energy—a move coined by the press as 
an “Ausstieg aus dem Ausstieg,” or exit from the exit.119 The original legislation was 
ratified by the upper house in the German Parliament in 2002 by the previous 
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government, under a coalition between the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) that lasted from 1998 to 2005.  
The legislation, championed by the Green Minister for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Jürgen Tritten, was a hard-fought consensus between 
hard-liners and more pragmatic members in the Green party, the SPD, and Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) operators.120 Negotiated in the summer of 2000 and signed by members of 
the administration and industry the following June, the agreement capped the total 
lifetime hours of operation for the 19 active plants to 2,623 Terawatt hours, including a 
theoretical 11 years of operation for the NPP at Mülheim-Kärlich, which had stopped 
operations in 1988 for regulatory reasons stemming from concerns over earthquakes. 
Operating hours were allocated by NPP, with NPP Kraftwerk Neckarwestheim II 
receiving the longest allotment at 20 years. The hours could be reallocated among NPPs, 
however, and no absolute phase-out date was stipulated.  
The agreement also called for the end of transporting spent nuclear fuel to 
reprocessing plants at La Hague, France, and Sellafield, Great Britain. It called on the 
NPPs to establish intermediate storage facilities for the spent fuel and to continue 
exploration for a final storage facility. The NPPs agreed to adhere to strict safety 
protocols like periodic inspections and agreed to greater coverage and increased 
premiums for accident insurance. Finally, the agreement stipulated that no additional 
NPPs would be built in Germany.121  
b. Green-Red Alliance Government 
To understand how this nuclear phase-out legislation entered into policy, we must 
consider how the Greens were able to enter government, for no other party had placed an 
anti-nuclear agenda so firmly in its platform. The 1998 to 2005 participation in 
government was not unique—coalition governments including Green parties were being 
elected into power in France and Finland around the same time, with governments in 
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Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden to follow in subsequent years—but it 
did mark the first time that the Green party had entered into the Federal government in 
Germany.122 While entry into government was an undeniable accomplishment, the Green 
Party actually lost seats in the Bundestag compared to the previous election—winning 
only 6.7% of the seats—and its entry into government was more attributable to the 
Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) decline and the SPD’s consequent advance. A poor 
economy and high unemployment unseated the CDU/CSU-FDP government, ending a 16 
year (1982-1998) era of CDU/CSU dominion, and gave the SPD enough seats in 
parliament to form a coalition government with the Green Party.123 The Green Party’s 
landing in government was not purely for reasons external to it; it has been a reliable 
participant in regional and national governments, regularly polling at 20% and winning 
more than 10% of the seats in the Bundestag in the last two election cycles.124 The 
success of the Greens is reflective of the strength of the greater public sentiment toward 
ecology, and the history of the anti-nuclear movement can be traced alongside the history 
of the Green party. 
c. History of the Greens and the Anti-Nuclear Energy Movement in 
Germany 
It is argued that the anti-nuclear energy movement actually traces its roots to the 
United States, where local protests in 1958 against the planned construction of a NPP in 
Bodega Bay, California successfully halted the venture.125 The first European 
demonstrations against nuclear power did not take place until 1971 and were actually 
held in France. Like the Bodega Bay protest, though, they were generally local initiatives 
assembled to combat the construction of specific plants. The movement made its first 
successful entry into German public policy debates with protests against the construction 
                                                 
122 Wikipedia, s.v. “Alliance ‘90/The Greens,” accessed September 2, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Alliance_%2790/The_Greens.  
123 “Alliance ‘90/The Greens,” Wikipedia. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Joachim Radkau, “Eine kurze Geschichte der Deutschen Antiatomkraftbewegung,” 
Bundescentrale fur Politische Bildung, 11 October 2011, http://www.bpb.de/apuz/59680/eine-kurze-
geschichte-der-deutschen-antiatomkraftbewegung?p=all. 
 36
of a NPP at Wyhl in 1975. The protesters were an odd alliance of local farmers and 
vintners joined by students from the nearby liberal hotspot of Freiburg.126 Rather than 
receive their energy from the student protest movement of the time, protestors were said 
to have been inspired by a recent successful protest against a chemical plant across the 
border in Strasbourg.127  
In any case, the success of the protests in halting the plans for the NPP were a 
strong boon to the anti-nuclear movement in Germany, which continued with protests 
throughout the country until its high point in the late 1970s. Following the nuclear 
accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, 200,000 protesters convened upon West 
Germany’s seat of government in Bonn.128  
It was this strength of the anti-nuclear movement that precipitated the creation of 
the Green Party in 1980. From that point the Green Party began a gradual transition from 
fringe group into an established mainstream party, and thus progressively changed its 
confrontational and obstructionist tactics—protests and the use of lawsuits and judicial 
injunctions to thwart planned NPPs or the transport of spent fuel—to more pragmatic 
ones, as witnessed by the 2002 phase-out plan.129 The Party’s popularity has surged and 
waned, buoyed by nuclear accidents and perennial issues like the transportation and 
storage of nuclear waste, but support has steadily increased. It has achieved continuous 
representation in the Bundestag since 1983 and has even won 10% of the seats in the past 
two elections; it now stands as one of the strongest Green parties in the world.130 
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3. Nuclear Weapons and the Peace Movement 
a. Postwar Political Culture 
The anti-nuclear energy movement is often linked to the peace movement and 
anti-nuclear weapons movement that predated it. Anti-war and anti-nuclear weapon 
sentiment is attributed, in part, to a political culture that emerged in Germany following 
World War II. The ignominy and shame felt by Germany following the fall of Nazi rule 
caused Germans to discredit their cultural heritage and left them without a political 
identity, territorial nationalism, national sovereignty, or cultural pride.131 This caused the 
budding West German country to cleave both to international organizations (NATO and 
the UN) for security and a protector (the United States) for identity.132 Furthermore, the 
trauma from the experiences of the war engendered a strong anti-military and anti-war 
sentiment within the populace.  
b. Kampf dem Atomtod 
Ironically, it was aligning under the United States and its NATO Allies and 
deriving security from them that afforded West Germany the avenue to rearm, and the 
Bundeswehr was formed on November 12, 1955, half a year after West Germany’s 
official accession into NATO in May 1955.133 The West German public’s anti-
militarization backlash to the rearmament came to a fore and merged with anti-nuclear 
sentiment in 1957 when then-Chancellor Adenauer made clear that his rearmament plans 
included outfitting the one-year old Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. His intentions 
were all the more incendiary when he notoriously discounted nuclear weapons as “natural 
extensions of artillery.”134 This assertion, along with a critical response from renowned 
German physicists—which came to be known as the Gottingen Manifesto—unleashed the 
                                                 
131 John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” 
International Organization vol. 53, no. 4 (1999): 779; Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Origins 
of Estrangement: the Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany,” 
International Security vol. 12, no. 1 (1987): 73. 
132 Mueller, “Origins of Estrangement,” 72. 
133 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 47. 
134 Axel Schildt, “Die Friedensbewegung 1958,” Spiegel Online, April 16, 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/50-jahre-friedensbewegung-a-946874.html.  
 38
latent angst in the German populace and became the source for the first wide-spread 
extra-parliamentary opposition to the Federal Republic of Germany. Demonstrating under 
the auspices of the “Kampf dem Atomtod,” or “fight against nuclear death,” protesters 
assembled throughout the Federal Republic, with some 200,000 gathering in Hamburg.135 
While the demonstrations were largely supported by the opposition party, the SPD, they 
garnered support from the churches and unions as well, and their ranks included members 
from all sectors of society.136 To be sure, the movement had the support of the larger 
West German populace, and a poll conducted in 1958 reported that 83% of citizens were 
against the installation of nuclear missile launchers in West Germany.137 
c. Nuclear Battleground 
It must be mentioned that a considerable factor for West German angst 
concerning the nuclear armament of West Germany—especially with tactical nuclear 
weapons—was the realization that Germany would be the first victim of these weapons. 
Germany, as a divided nation hosting forces from two competing superpowers, would be 
the battleground for any confrontation between the two, and the nuclear weapons hosted 
on German territory by both sides would be employed within its borders at the cost of 
German lives.  
This foreboding was reawakened when détente broke down in the late 1970s and 
the North Atlantic Council approved a plan to deploy a new generation of intermediate 
range cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe.138 West Germans (along with other Western 
Europeans) saw in then-President Reagan’s off-the-cuff suggestions of a “limited” 
nuclear war the United States’ intention to confine a nuclear confrontation between the 
USSR and the U.S. to Europe.139 Protests against the deployment of Pershing II missiles 
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were inspired by visions of such a “Euroshima,” and were widespread throughout 
northern Europe. Incidentally, the anti-war and anti-nuclear protests of the early 1980s 
coincided with the Green Party’s first entry into the German parliament.140 
d. Qualifying the Connection 
The connection between the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear energy 
movements is not clear-cut. While the anti-nuclear weapons movement has its roots in the 
1950s, the anti-nuclear energy movement did not take shape until the 1970s. The anti-
nuclear weapons movement was initially limited to the application of nuclear technology 
in war, and there was widespread political and social approval for civil applications of 
nuclear technology in the 1950s. Conceptions of a peaceful nuclear era in which all of 
humanity could exist in prosperity were propagated at the UN “Atoms for Peace” 
Conference in 1955, and this conception received little criticism in West German 
society.141 Even the SPD, which was said to have orchestrated the demonstrations of the 
Kampf dem Atomtod, stood squarely behind the civil uses of nuclear energy, and physicist 
Max Born, who was among the 18 physicists to publish the Gottinger Manifesto, saw in 
nuclear technology hope for a “paradise on earth.”142  
There is nonetheless a link between the anti-war, anti-nuclear weapons, and anti-
nuclear energy movements. To be sure, these issues were merged into the Green Party’s 
platform, and the Party, which was primarily responsible for the incorporation of nuclear 
phase-out plans into legislation, took form in the midst of the anti-nuclear peace 
demonstrations of the 1980s. It was also through the nuclear weapons debate that the 
West German populace was conditioned to mistrust a government that it perceived it 
could do little to influence, as will be explored in the next section.  
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C. COMPARISONS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY THEORY 
To get a better impression of the significance of Germany’s plan to phase out 
nuclear power, Germany must be compared to its peers in Europe. Not only must public 
opinion be compared among the European countries, but the relative strength of anti-
nuclear movements should be assessed, along with their abilities to affect change in 
national policy. Public opinion in itself is not a good measure of political outcomes, as it 
must be effectively mobilized and harnessed to effect changes in policy. This section will 
now compare Germany’s public opinion, mobilization, and public policy regarding 
nuclear power with those of its European neighbors, and will then consider a major 
theory for why outcomes in Germany differed from those of its neighbors. 
1. Public Opinion 
Public opinion on nuclear energy in the EU is subject to periodic polls. Since its 
inception in 1973, the EU Public Opinion Analysis Sector has performed several 
“Eurobarometer” polls of the populations of its member countries on the issue of nuclear 
energy and safety, with the most recent poll being published in 2010, when the debate 
regarding extending the life of NPPs was a hot topic in Germany.143 It must be noted that 
this latest poll was published prior to the nuclear accident in Fukushima, and public 
perceptions across Europe are likely to have become more unfavorable to nuclear energy 
since then. This poll nonetheless provides insight on general trends in German and 
European opinion prior to the accident.  
Public issue life-cycle notwithstanding, the most recent Eurobarometer poll 
revealed that opinion regarding nuclear energy has proven to be slow-changing. Most 
Europeans believed that nuclear power had merit, especially in promoting energy 
independence: 68% believed that it improved energy security, and 51% believed it helped 
with affordable prices, while only 46% believed that it helped limit climate change. 
Respondents in Germany tended to be on the middle-of-the-road with all of these 
questions, with 72% agreeing that nuclear energy helped limit dependence on fuel 
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imports.144 In general, respondents from countries with existing nuclear programs tended 
to consider themselves more knowledgeable on nuclear matters, were more likely to have 
formulated an opinion about nuclear issues, and tended to have more favorable opinions 
on the merits of nuclear energy.  
That being said, already as of 2010, the majority of respondents were in favor of 
maintaining (as opposed to increasing) or decreasing nuclear energy (73%). Interestingly, 
Germany was one of only two countries (Hungary being the other) where the number of 
respondents that favored decreasing the share of nuclear energy increased from the 
previous survey in 2006. Even then, 37% of the German populace was in favor of 
reducing the share of nuclear energy, while the EU average was slightly less at 34%.  
In conclusion, while Germany posted results that were slightly less favorable to 
nuclear energy than would be expected of a country with a considerable share of power 
from nuclear energy, it tended to have middle-of-the-road responses when compared to 
EU averages.  
2. Policy 
Germany is by no means unique in its decision to phase-out nuclear energy. The 
first country to make a decision against nuclear energy was Austria, which instituted a 
still-standing ban on nuclear energy in 1978, shortly before its one NPP was scheduled to 
go online. Italy, similarly, decided by referendum to close its four NPPs following the 
Chernobyl catastrophe. A plan to reintroduce nuclear power into the country’s energy 
mix was put forth by then-Prime Minister Berlusconi but was overwhelmingly rejected 
by a referendum in 2011. More recent policy decisions to phase out nuclear energy have 
been made in Belgium and Switzerland. Belgium currently plans to phase out its NPPs by 
2025 and Switzerland by 2034. The stakes for both of these countries are similar to those 
for Germany, as Belgium’s seven NPPs currently produce 54% of its electricity and 
Switzerland’s five plants produce 34% of its electricity.  
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Table 1.   European Policy Summary on Nuclear Energy145 
Pro-Nuclear 
Britain 
15 NPPs with plans for next generation. 1 NPP under construction, but controversial 
and experiencing financing difficulties 
Czech Republic 6 NPPs with more planned 
Finland 4 NPPs producing 30% of electricity with 5th planned 
France 
58 NPPs with plans for 2. National Assembly voted to limit nuclear share to 50% by 
2025 (currently 75%) 
Lithuania  1 NPP planned 
Netherlands 1 NPP and 1 planned. 1994 bill to close plant was reversed in 2005. 
Poland Reaffirmed 2005 plans to add nuclear by 2025 
Romania 2 NPPs with 2 more planned 
Slovakia  4 NPPs with 2 planned 
Slovenia 1 NPP but considering more 
Sweden 
Planned phase-out after 3-Mile Island, but reversed decision. 9 NPPs producing 
40% of national supply with 2/3 public support 
Anti-nuclear 
Austria Built plant in 1978 but never operated after ban on nuclear energy. 
Belgium 
7 NPPs producing 54% of electricity. 2003 phase out plan will shutter last plant by 
2025 with no replacement. 
Italy 
Closed 4 NPPs after post-Chernobyl referendum. Berlusconi plan to reintroduce 
nuclear power was overwhelmingly rejected by 2011 referendum. 10% of electricity 
is imported from foreign NPPs 
Spain 7 NPPs built in 1980s with no replacement plans, will reach end of license in 2020s 
Switzerland 
5 NPPs producing 34% of electricity will be retired by 2034. 2013 poll reported 
68% supported continued operation 
  
In general, however, most European countries that have nuclear power as part of 
their energy mixes are maintaining the status quo (or expanding the share of nuclear), and 
several countries are planning to add nuclear energy into their energy mixes (see Table 
1). Both Lithuania and Poland, for instance, plan to build NPPs (with Poland’s expected 
to go online in 2025), and France is wholly committed to nuclear energy with 58 NPPs 
and plans to build two more (though a recent measure approved by the National 
Assembly will reduce nuclear power from 75% of electricity generation to 50% by 2025). 
While Sweden planned a phase-out of nuclear energy following the 3-Mile Island 
meltdown, this decision was reversed and continued operation of its nine NPPs is 
supported by two-thirds of its populace.  
While Germany’s plan to phase-out nuclear power is not unique, it does counter 
the general continued political support for nuclear power in Europe, and represents the 
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hastiest retreat from nuclear energy, especially considering Germany’s previous 
commitment to nuclear power. While Swiss and Belgian NPPs produced greater shares of 
their countries’ electricity supplies, Germany’s total capital investment in nuclear energy 
far exceeds that of both of these countries (Germany will close more plants than these 
two countries combined), Germany will be the first of these three to completely close its 
NPPs, and Germany’s plans are the only ones that include closing plants prematurely, 
prior to their 40-year life expectancies.146  
3. Opportunity Theory 
What then can explain the success of Germany’s Green Party in passing 
legislation for a quick phase-out of nuclear energy in Germany, when German public 
opinion is only middle-of-the-road when compared with the rest of Europe? How could 
the German Green Party so effectively mobilize and capitalize on nuclear incidents 
outside of Germany, when other European countries were arguably witnesses to the same 
events and objective conditions? To answer this question we turn to Political Opportunity 
Theory.  
Political Opportunity Theory posits that the strategies protest movements will use 
and their chances for success are dependent on the political opportunities available to 
them: resources, institutional arrangements, and precedents for protest that then act to 
assist or thwart the movement.147 Chances for movement success are not dependent 
purely on grievances or on popular support, then, but also on the political opportunities 
afforded to the movement. As Koopmans and Duyvendak explain, grievances themselves 
are not sufficient; they must be given meaning by human agents, and a movement must 
successfully capitalize on grievances to mobilize public will.148 Koopmans and 
Duyvendak demonstrate that while nuclear disasters like Chernobyl arguably affected the 
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countries of Western Europe equally, and while the populations in the Western European 
countries were subject to the same grievances concerning nuclear energy, the anti-nuclear 
movements in the countries differed in their effectiveness at bringing about policy change 
because of the political opportunities afforded to them.149 Kitschelt identifies the 
institutional differences that affect a movement’s political opportunities and the strategies 
that correspond to each of the differences. He categorizes regimes as either open or 
closed and weak or strong.150  
Closed regimes are generally characterized by few political parties, the 
centralization of decision-making in the executive and not the legislature, the 
inaccessibility of decision-makers to interest groups, and the absence of mechanisms to 
aggregate demands and incorporate them into policy. In these regimes, interests that are 
in power are free to form cartels that are resistant to opposing interests. Pro-nuclear 
interests dominated the French government, and anti-nuclear views found no champion in 
the bipolar political terrain of 1980s or any mechanism with which to effect policy 
change. West Germany at this time was similarly controlled by a pro-nuclear government 
and its two relatively closed major parties also afforded the anti-nuclear movement 
minimal access to the policy-making process.151 In open regimes, decision-making 
authority is more subject to constituency pressure, and opposing views are more likely to 
gain a voice in the political process. Kitschelt uses Sweden’s fractionated party structure 
that emphasizes consensus-building as an example here.  
Strong regimes are ones in which the state is highly effective at implementing 
policy changes. They are centralized, exercise much control over market participants, and 
are unencumbered by strong independent judiciaries. Here again, the French government, 
with its power vested heavily in a centralized executive and with much influence over 
business and society, serves as an example of a strong government; it was because of the 
strong executive branch that he created that President de Gaulle could so fully implement 
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his nuclear vision for the country. Germany, by contrast, is a relatively weak regime, as 
its federal system creates a diffuse power structure and its independent judiciary provides 
a strong check on the government’s power.  
The anti-nuclear movement in France, because of France’s closed government, 
was left with a confrontational strategy, and attempted to effect policy change primarily 
by way of protests. While it was quite active and arguably effective at mobilizing the 
populace, it was ultimately unsuccessful at effecting change in the face of such a strong 
regime. In comparison, while West Germany’s regime was similarly closed and also 
instigated a confrontational and adversarial strategy on the part of the anti-nuclear 
movement there, this strategy achieved more success because of the weak and diffuse 
regime it met. Protests in West Germany were less likely to be met by a strong police 
force, and were more likely to be cast in a positive light in the media. The German Green 
Party learned early on that litigation and judicial injunctions in the courts were an 
effective means of thwarting the construction of NPPs.152  
Strong governments also limit access of opposition voices by controlling the 
public discourse. This became evident in the aftermath of the nuclear meltdown at 
Chernobyl. Thus, while the pro-nuclear French government was able to dominate the 
narrative in the media and convince the public of the reliability of its safety measures 
following the meltdown, the similarly pro-nuclear West German federal government was 
thwarted from doing so by state and local governments that cancelled sporting events and 
ordered produce to be discarded.153 
It is evident, then, that the success of the Green Party in effecting change was at 
least in part due to the institutional framework that it was confronted with. A closed 
regime fueled popular protest and prompted a confrontational strategy while the 
weakness of the regime afforded it relative success.154 As Koopmans and Duyvendak 
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explain, movement success in turn acts to affect public opinion, which promotes future 
chances for success. The Green movement in West Germany was able to capitalize on the 
Chernobyl disaster more than comparable movements in France in part because it had 
just successfully mobilized against the construction of a reprocessing plant a year earlier 
in Wackersdorf.155 Movement successes reaffirmed the public’s conviction that nuclear 
energy must in fact be undesirable, and this consolidation of public support further 
emboldened the anti-nuclear-energy movement.  
It was perhaps this progressive strengthening that afforded the Green Party its 
inroad into government and allowed it to transition from a fringe opposition movement 
into a recognized and established political party. This transition into government and the 
transition of the German government from a relatively closed one to a more open one 
necessitated a change in strategy on the part of the Green movement, and explains the 
more conciliatory approach taken by the party in its negotiations with the nuclear sector 
when drafting its phase-out plan in 2002.156  
D. NUCLEAR PHASE-OUT AND GERMAN ENERGY SECURITY 
Considering Germany’s history, the rising influence of the Green Party, the 
support of the German populace, and the policies of all the major parties on both sides of 
the political spectrum, the German nuclear phase-out is unlikely to be reversed again. 
Indeed, the phase-out is no longer considered controversial in German politics, and it 
receives little attention in the media or in parliament. It is by and large a fait accompli; 
the German people have moved on.157 While this may be so, Germany nonetheless 
cannot “move on” from the consequences of the phase-out. Germany must face its 
implications with regard to energy security. 
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Nuclear energy can be seen as occupying an energy trilemma sweet-spot. It touts 
relatively low energy costs and low GHG emissions, and provides relative energy 
security for the countries that employ it.158 2013 U.S. Energy Information Association 
(EIA) figures place the levelized cost of nuclear energy on par with traditional thermal 
energy sources at 10 to11 cents per kWh. In comparison, on-shore wind costs were 8.7 
cents per kWh, photovoltaic was 14 cents per kWh, and offshore wind was 22.2 cents per 
kWh.159 In terms of carbon emissions, the 2014 United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change found that electricity from nuclear energy does not directly 
emit GHG, and even when considering life cycle carbon emissions (which include GHG 
emissions during plant construction and resource extraction, enrichment, and disposal), 
nuclear energy exhibits the lowest GHG footprint of any source save wind.160  
Perhaps more than for its ecological or economical attributes, nuclear energy first 
gained popularity for its energy security advantages. As the World Nuclear Association 
highlights, France and Japan turned to nuclear energy in the context of the first oil shock 
of 1973 and with the intention of protecting themselves from the unreliable and insecure 
oil market.161 In contrast to the then-unstable oil market, the market for uranium was 
perceived as relatively stable. Uranium, the fuel most commonly relied upon for nuclear 
energy, could be obtained from diverse geographical regions and from countries (such as 
Canada and Australia) that were relatively stable.162 Furthermore, uranium, by virtue of 
its low relative price, high density, and long useful life, could be stockpiled much more 
readily than fossil fuels. To illustrate, while three million tons of coal are required to 
                                                 
158 “Life cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, last updated 
July 13, 2016, http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/images/lca_harm_over_1.png. 
159 “The Economics of Nuclear Power,” World Nuclear Association, updated July 2016, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx. 
160 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014, Climate Change 2014—Mitigation of Climate 
Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 548, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf; It should be noted, however, that GHG, a common ecological measure of 
energy sources, does not capture the potential environmental hazards associated with nuclear material, and 
the report does identify this concern. 
161 “Energy Security,” World Nuclear Association, updated April 2014, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/energy-security.aspx. 
162 “Uranium Production Figures: 2004–2014,” World Nuclear Association, updated July 2015, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/uranium-production-figures.aspx. 
 48
power a 1,000 MWe power plant for one year, only 30 tons of fabricated nuclear fuel are 
required to do the same.163  
In this context, Germany’s nuclear phase-out, irrespective of which source is used 
to replace it, can be regarded as decreasing German energy security. Replacing nuclear 
energy with traditional fossil fuels—in addition to hampering German transition goals—
will increase German dependence on imports. Replacing nuclear energy with renewable 
energies, while not directly increasing import-dependency, poses other concerns that are 
addressed in the next section.  
The nuclear phase-out decreases energy security in another respect. NPPs are 
generally seen as reliable sources for base-load supply. They are relatively better at 
providing steady output, and thus have a stabilizing influence on the electrical grid, 
which is vulnerable to sudden swings in load or demand. This reliability contrasts with 
more intermittent energy sources—especially renewable energy sources, to be described 
in the next section. The 2011 report of the German Federal Network Agency, BNetzA, 
thus pointed out that the nuclear phase-out would lead to vulnerabilities in Germany’s 
grid and to an increased need for costly interventions on the part of network operators.164  
There is at least one positive security aspect to the nuclear phase-out: the removal 
of NPPs and nuclear fuel as targets of terrorist attack. While NPPs are not necessarily 
more vulnerable than other components of the energy infrastructure, they might be 
perceived as having greater strategic value to would-be terrorists, and thus they have been 
traditionally more apt to raise public anxiety.165 It is unclear whether the absence of 
NPPs from the German power grid would decrease the likelihood of terrorist attack, but 
their absence might nonetheless assuage public concerns over energy security. 
Nonetheless, this thesis still deems the nuclear phase-out as decreasing German energy 
security.  
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E. NUCLEAR PHASE-OUT AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
This thesis now considers regional security and stability, again relying on the 
liberal framework of democracy, interconnectedness, and IGOs to promote regional 
stability and security.  
1. Democracy  
a. Political dynamics in Germany 
As this case demonstrates, while energy issues are influenced by politics, they 
may also influence politics. As indicated earlier, the Green Party’s success is due in large 
part to the nuclear issue. This section attempts to clarify the effects that nuclear energy 
and the rise of the Green Party have had on German politics, and what this means for 
democracy in Germany. 
 For over thirty years after the reestablishment of the German state (first, as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany), German politics were effectively 
defined by a two-party system, with the government being alternately controlled by one 
of the two dominant center-left and center-right parties—the SPD and the CDU (joined 
later by the CSU). These two parties were accompanied by the smaller but also centrist 
Free Democratic Party (FDP). Because the dominant parties rarely enjoyed majorities in 
parliament (the CDU/CSU had an absolute majority in 1957–1961) until 1998, the larger 
parties usually formed coalitions with the FDP and even, in three instances (1965-1969, 
2005–2009, and since 2013), formed “grand coalitions” with one another in order to form 
a government. This has led to Germany’s nick-name of the “Grand Coalition State,” and 
has created a centripetal tendency in politics that brought party platforms toward the 
center and encouraged across-the-aisle cooperation.166  
The Green Party’s 1998 entry into a left-leaning government with the SPD upset 
this traditional balance. In recent years, the traditional parties have been joined by a 
number of new parties. Parties like the Pirate Party (2006), the Left (2007), the 
Alternative for Germany (2013), and Alliance for Progress and Renewal (2015) have all 
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emerged since the Greens’ entry into government. To some extent these parties were 
encouraged into existence by the success of the Green Party (which, as was noted earlier, 
owes its success, in part, to the nuclear issue). While all these parties are relatively minor 
and generally enjoy little representation in the federal parliament (save for the Greens and 
the Left, which have significant representation), their representation has trended upwards, 
with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) winning double-digit percentages in several state 
parliaments and even displacing the traditional dominant parties to win second place in 
both Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania in 2016.  
The emergence of these new and more polarized parties has been accompanied 
with a drop in representation for the traditional centrist parties, with the FDP, for the first 
time since 1949, altogether losing representation in the federal parliament in 2013.  
The full impact of these developments on German politics has yet to be seen. 
While the emergence of a multi-party system appears to favor Chancellor Merkel and the 
status quo for the time being, the centripetal tendency in German politics may be 
increasingly replaced with a centrifugal one.167 If left or right-leaning coalitions like the 
Red-Green coalition of 1998–2005 become more commonplace, even the centrist parties 
may begin to drift toward the political poles in order to accommodate this social trend.  
What impact will these developments have on German and regional security? 
Considering our liberal framework, what do the developments bode for democracy in 
Germany? On the one hand, the presence of more parties in the Bundestag might be seen 
as improving the degree to which political institutions reflect the diverse interests of the 
society they represent, and thus strengthening democracy in Germany. To be sure, it was 
not until the Green Party emerged as a player in German politics that the anti-nuclear 
energy sentiments of the German people came to be reflected in politics with a party 
focused predominantly on nuclear issues. On the other hand, an increasingly divided 
political sphere does not bode well for a smoothly functioning government. As the 
ideological gap between left and right segments of the political spectrum increases, the 
                                                 




ability for cooperation and compromise amongst the players might wane. Political 
theorists point out that compromise is an imperative in a functioning democracy, and that 
legislation would not pass and the government would not function without it.168 If the 
changing political dynamics in Germany undermine the functioning of democracy, they 
would, according to the liberal framework posed earlier, decrease security and stability. 
b. Costs 
The costs of the nuclear phase-out and may also have implications for democracy 
in Germany. The immediate economic costs of the phase-out have been assessed in terms 
of lost revenues by the NPPs. As noted earlier, it had been estimated that utility 
companies would have received somewhere between 21 and 73 billion euros in additional 
profits with the 2010 decision to extend the lives of the NPPs; this estimate approximates 
the revenues lost by shuttering the plants ahead of schedule. The four utility companies 
that operate Germany’s NPPs have filed over 30 lawsuits and constitutional complaints 
totaling over 20 billion euro in an effort to recoup some of these lost profits, as they argue 
that the phase-out decision was unfair and unconstitutional.169  
While not as easily quantifiable, an assessment of the economic costs of the 
phase-out should also consider the lost jobs associated with shuttering NPPs and the 
effective elimination of an entire industry. While Germany’s two largest energy 
companies reported that they could cut as many as 14,000 jobs because of the phase-out, 
the final number of jobs lost is likely to be much higher.170 Siemens, which built all of 
Germany’s existing plants as well as others worldwide, announced its intention to stop 
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building NPPs shortly after the German phase-out was announced.171 In addition to 
construction and operation, training, research, and technology jobs will also no doubt be 
cut as the energy sector is restructured.  
In addition to the aforementioned costs, one must consider the cost of 
decommissioning the power plants, processing the nuclear waste, and transporting 
nuclear waste to final storage facilities. While these costs would have eventually been 
borne regardless of the phase-out, they have been concentrated and accelerated by it. 
Estimates of the costs of dismantling range widely, and experts admit that Germany lacks 
the technical and economic experience to fully assess the costs.172 If past and ongoing 
experience serves as an example, decommissioning and dismantling operations have been 
underway since the Rheinsberg NPP went offline in 1990 and are expected to continue 
until 2025. Estimates for the total expense of these operations amount to 600 million 
euros.173 With more than 20 NPPs needing dismantling by 2022, costs will assuredly 
reach into the billions, and operations will likely continue until at least 2050. Processing 
and storage of the waste, too, will certainly amount to billions of euros and take years to 
accomplish. A final repository for heat-producing high-level waste, for instance, will not 
likely be found until 2031, after which it will likely not be ready to start accepting 
shipments until 2050.  
Clean-up costs were expected to be borne by the energy corporations, which were 
mandated to set aside a fund in anticipation of this. With clean-up expected to exceed the 
38 billion euros in the fund, and owing to the poor financial state of the energy 
corporations, it is expected that the costs will ultimately be borne by the government and 
by society at large. Michael Mueller of the parliament’s Final Repository Search 
Commission stated that costs would rise to 50 billion or 70 billion euros in the near-term, 
and estimates have been made of a 170 billion euro price tag by 2099.174 Add to this the 
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cost of replacing the electricity-generation capacity lost through the phase-out—which 
Siemens in one estimate placed at a whopping 1.7 trillion euros—and the German tax-
payer will most definitely feel the effects of the phase-out for decades to come.175 
What will the effect of this debt be on democracy in Germany? While it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, there is ample research correlating economic down-turns (which 
this debt aggregation might trigger) and the breakdown of democracy in a country.176 If 
debt from the nuclear phase-out contributes to a significant down-turn in Germany’s 
economy that in turn triggers a breakdown of democracy, liberal theory predicts that the 
net effect will be a corresponding breakdown in regional stability and security. 
2. Interconnectedness and IGOs 
That Germany’s response to the Fukushima disaster—like that of the other EU 
nations—was largely an independent decision not made in concert with the EU or its 
neighbors underlines the reality that the EU does not create energy policy and that 
decisions affecting energy remain squarely at the national level.177 If anything, the 
German phase-out decision contradicted the wishes of the EU. In light of the German 
decision, then-climate Commissioner Connie Haageland urged the EU to stay the course, 
asserting that continued reliance on nuclear energy was vital to the EU’s achieving of its 
GHG emissions goals.178 The Fukushima crisis laid bare cleavages in energy policy 
within the EU. Not only did other EU nations not follow Germany’s path toward a 
nuclear-free energy mix, but groups of countries, including the Visegrad countries of 
Eastern Europe and even more broadly twelve states throughout the Union, have since 
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joined to announce their continued support for nuclear energy.179 These differences of 
opinion are underpinned by fundamental national concerns, as the Visegrad countries are 
counting on nuclear energy to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas.180  
The apparent autonomy with which energy policy is made should not be 
understood to imply that energy policy has no consequences outside of the national level. 
Indeed, as the EU becomes more and more interconnected, instabilities, like those created 
by Germany’s nuclear phase-out can propagate throughout the grid and affect 
neighboring countries. Increases in damaging loop flows and required interventions have 
been attributed by Germany’s neighbors to its energy policy (the effects of Germany’s 
Energiewende are discussed in further detail in the following chapter), and as noted in the 
previous chapter, unilateral or bilateral energy decisions can act to undermine greater EU 
goals. To the extent that the German nuclear phase-out reinforced the practice of 
nationalizing energy policy at the expense of EU climate and energy initiatives, it can be 
seen as undermining the EU as an IGO and therefore detracting from regional security 
and stability.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The 2011 decision to phase-out nuclear energy has roots that stretch back to 
Germany’s postwar political culture. Its roots extend to the German peace movement and 
follow the rise of the Green Party from a grassroots protest movement to an established 
party. The party was able to mobilize and magnify anti-nuclear energy sentiment because 
of political opportunity structures presented to it in the German political system. Perhaps 
it was because of its success that these opportunity structures evolved, and Germany went 
from being a regime dominated by three long-established parties to one that included the 
Green Party in the policy-making apparatus. So too did the Green Party’s strategy shift 
from a confrontational one to a pragmatic one based on consensus-building.  
                                                 




The pro-nuclear voice, now in opposition, is unlikely to find the same path to 
success enjoyed by the Green Party, and another attempt to reverse the phase-out plan is 
not likely. The CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the ever-strengthening Green Party have all 
signed off on the phase-out, which is backed by an anti-nuclear populace that has been 
encouraged by the Green Party and like-minded policy advocates to mobilize against 
nuclear energy. Germany’s trajectory to a nuclear-free future is set, and Germany must 
deal with the consequences.  
While the ultimate impacts of the phase-out are yet to be seen, its rising costs 
could decrease democratic stability in Germany and thus decrease regional security. 
Furthermore, the possibility of a further polarization of politics in Germany—which has 
at least some foundation in the phase-out issue—may also have negative influences on 
democracy and thus security. Finally, Germany’s phase-out plan reaffirmed energy policy 
as a national prerogative, and the undermining of the EU energy agenda and 
supranational authority weakens the EU’s position and also—per liberal theory—acts to 
decrease stability and security. 
  
 56
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 57
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we turn to Germany’s relationship to perhaps the most significant 
Western European IGO, the European Union (EU), and the growing implications this 
relationship has had on energy and energy security matters. The EU was founded on the 
recognition that energy concerns are linked to security. The Schuman Plan, introduced by 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in 1950, conceived a supranational 
organization, the European Coal and Steel Community, which would aggregate the coal 
and steel production of the six original countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. While restoring Europe to prosperity and 
standardizing the means of production were among the goals of this plan, its primary 
objective was to improve security in the region. It reasoned that with these fundamental 
means for weapons production under the control of a single high authority rather than any 
one country, war in Europe (and specifically between France and Germany) would be 
“not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”181 In this respect it was correct; 
Europe has continued to integrate itself through the EU, and peace and relative prosperity 
have reigned on the continent in the sixty-plus years since the Plan’s inception.  
Energy security and security through energy have continued to be central to the 
EU. Along with a progressively increasing voice in energy matters, the EU has assumed 
more responsibility in climate matters related to the Union. It soon became evident that 
climate change and energy concerns were intimately related, and energy policies 
established by the EU more and more reflect this growing linkage. In lockstep with the 
EU, Germany too has increased its focus on climate, famously declaring a shift to 
renewable energies, the Energiewende. 
This chapter considers Germany’s relationship with the EU as it relates to climate 
and energy matters. It begins with an overview of EU and German green energy policy 
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and then discusses the ramifications of these policies to energy security and overall 
regional security. Specifically, the chapter argues that the shift in energy policy toward 
environmental concerns has had several negative effects on energy security and more 
broadly on security in and around the EU.  
B. EU GREEN ENERGY POLICIES 
EU climate policy began to form in the late 1980s, when climate concerns first 
gained traction. Through the Single European Act of 1987 the European Economic 
Community was granted the authority to establish environmental policy.182 Three pillars 
of EU climate policy were established: emissions reductions, sustainability, and 
efficiency increases.183  
Concrete policy obligations were established when EU members signed the UN 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change in 1997. The EU agreed to an 8% reduction in 
emissions from 1990 levels and launched the European Climate Change Program to 
explore ways to reduce emissions.  
In addition to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has established three other binding 
emissions commitments, with the major one being the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, 
which bound the EU to ambitious emissions and demand reductions of 20% and to 
establish a gross final production share of renewables of 20%.184  
Along with setting binding environmental objectives, the EU environmental 
policy also established a framework for achieving these objectives. Most notably, the EU 
implemented an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) that has been in force since 2005. 
Rather than tax emissions, the scheme gives emission allowances to major carbon-
intensive sectors. The Scheme has grown in size, and in 2012 encompassed roughly 40% 
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of GHG emissions in the EU. Proceeds from credit auctions are reinvested in low-carbon 
demonstration projects and other environmental programs. 
Also noteworthy are the EU’s efforts to establish a common energy grid. Article 
194 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in addition to giving 
the EU a legal base for establishing energy policy, promoted the interconnection of 
energy networks—a recognized prerequisite to the successful incorporation of renewable 
energies into the energy mix.  
C. GERMAN GREEN ENERGY POLICIES 
We next turn to German green energy policies. While German policies may be 
said to have been greatly influenced by EU policy, the reverse is also true, and Germany 
used its 2007 presidency of the EU to reinvigorate EU focus on renewable energies.185 It 
placed energy security and climate change as two of the most important items on the EU 
agenda, and it was in 2007 that the EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package targets were 
set.186 Furthermore, German national energy policy began to incorporate renewable 
energies and institute an Energiewende, or “energy transition,” relatively early on, and it 
was thus seen as pioneering the transition to renewable and low-carbon technologies.187  
German legislative promotion of renewable energies can be traced back to the 
Electricity Feed-in Law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) of 1991, which ensured that 
renewable energies had access to the grid and established a Feed-in Tariff (FIT) whereby 
utilities were required to pay a premium to purchase electricity from renewable energy 
providers. The premiums were pegged off of the previous year’s average electricity price, 
and varied depending on the renewable energy source—wind and solar power received 
preferential treatment with a FIT pegged at 90% of the average electricity price. This 
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tariff was passed on to consumers, and no government funds were used to finance 
renewable energy construction.188  
The Electricity Feed-in Law was superseded by the Renewable Energies Act 
(EEG) of 2000, which built upon existing legislation and corrected perceived flaws.189 
Because FIT remunerations had been perceived as too volatile, they were instead pegged 
on an absolute value that was based on the production cost plus profit, and were thus 
greatly increased. The new FIT targeted specific technologies, with solar energy 
receiving a FIT equivalent to eight times its production cost and wind energy receiving a 
FIT equivalent to four times its production cost. Furthermore, because the FIT was seen 
as unfairly penalizing regional grid operators with high concentrations of renewable 
energies, a national EEG surcharge was instituted whereby all households were subject to 
the same surcharge. Finally, because it was feared that the ever-increasing surcharge 
would threaten certain energy-intensive industries, these industries were exempted from 
the EEG, and only required to pay 5 cents per kWh.190  
Since its enactment in 2000, there have been several amendments to the EEG, 
with the most recent one occurring in 2014. The amendments revise FIT policy as well as 
targets for the market share of renewable energy, and the 2014 amendment instituted 
policy aimed at limiting the costs and growth of renewable energies.191 Overarching 
energy strategy was encapsulated in the 2010 Energy Concept, which set forth a vision 
for the German energy market where renewable energies were the “cornerstone” and 
were facilitated by increases in energy efficiency, a transition away from a fossil fuel-
based transportation system, a strengthened grid, and, controversially, the use of nuclear 
energy as a “bridging technology.”192 As mentioned in the previous chapter, an extension 
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to the lives of existing NPPs was intended to offset the cost for the energy transition, but 
was overturned after the disaster at Fukushima the following year, and an absolute 
nuclear phase-out date of 2022 was set. Importantly, the Energy Concept also established 
German targets on emissions, consumption, and the share of renewable energies in 
supply. GHG emissions were to be cut by 40% from 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% by 
2050. Renewable energies were to constitute at least 18% of gross final energy 
consumption and 35% of gross final electricity consumption by 2020. Finally, gross 
energy consumption would be 20% lower than 2008 levels and 50% lower by 2050.193 
Gross electricity consumption would be 10% lower than 2008 levels. 
D. POLICY EFFECTS 
1. Emissions, Consumption, and Renewable Energies 
While there have been criticisms of its effectiveness, German and EU 
environmental policy has undoubtedly had an impact on energy consumption and 
emissions. Notably, the EU announced a decoupling of GHG emissions and economic 
growth: while 2012 real GDP was 45% higher than in 1990, GHG emissions decreased 
by 19.2%.194 This section details Germany-specific results. 
In 2011, renewable energy contributed to 35.1 million tons of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe) energy, or 11.3% of the Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES). This marks a 
200% increase over the 10.8 Mtoe produced in 2000. During this same time period, total 
energy consumption declined by 7.4%, with marked decreases occurring in coal and 
nuclear energy consumption. Renewable energy enjoyed gains in share of electricity 
production as well: 22% of total supply was provided by renewables, with 8.1% of that 
coming from wind power and 7.3% from biofuels and waste. While wind power was 
more instrumental in delivering electricity, biofuels and waste were utilized more for heat 
production and transport.195 
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How does Germany stand with regard to its production, efficiency, and emissions 
targets? According to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy Fourth 
Energy Transition Monitoring Summary, renewables covered 13.5% of gross final energy 
consumption and 27.4% of gross final electricity consumption in 2014.196 Extrapolating 
on current trends, both 2020 goals for renewable shares of gross final energy and 
electricity consumptions will be met.  
In terms of energy consumption, 2014 gross energy consumption was only 8.7% 
lower than 2008 levels, and electricity consumption only 4.6% lower. According to a 
recent Deutsche Bank report, Germany is thus likely to miss its efficiency goals barring 
any significant changes.197 The report highlights the challenges of the original efficiency 
targets, as they were made irrespective of population growth and achieving them will 
depend on technological improvements. Furthermore, the gross electricity consumption 
decrease is particularly challenging, as emissions and efficiency goals in both the 
transportation and heating sectors are predicated on a shift of consumption in these 
sectors to the electricity sector.198  
Finally, with respect to emissions, Germany in 2014 reported a 27% decrease in 
GHG when compared with 1990 levels. The BMWi admits that maintenance of the 
current trend will result in an emissions reduction of 33 to 34% by 2020—short of the 
40% goal.199 While the BMWi report asserts that further regulations adopted in 2014 will 
help to fill the gap, the Deutsche Bank report is more skeptical. It points to the fact that 
many of the post-1990 decreases in GHG emissions were the result of structural shifts 
resulting from German reunification, and that emissions reductions have tapered off in 
recent years.200 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the GHG-friendly NPPs that are 
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being phased-out will likely need to be replaced, at least in part, by more carbon-
intensive fossil fuels-burning plants. Furthermore, to the extent that renewable energies 
are replacing capacity once supplied by the NPPs, they are not acting to decrease net 
electricity emissions for the country.201 Finally, the Deutsche Bank report again points to 
the need for uncertain technological advances in energy storage and energy efficiency in 
order to meet the emissions targets and effect the transition.202 
Table 2.   German Energy Statistics203 
  1990 2011 2012 
NET IMPORTS Coal 123.13 145.82  150.64 
Oil 799.06  900.33  907.58 
Natural Gas 163.87  355.16  348.57 
CONSUMPTION % Coal 10.6 3.4 3.3 
Oil 44.5  42.4 41.2 
Gas 20.0 21.9  22.7 
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION % 
Coal 40.0 26.5  28.1 
Oil 8.7  2.2  2.2 
Gas 7.5 21.4  17.8 
Nuclear 30.9 27.8  27.0 
Wind — 5.5  6.3 
TFC/GDP  0.11 0.08 0.08 
TFC/CAPITA  2.36 2.27  2.25 
ENERGY-RELATED 
CO2 EMISSIONS204 
 4067.8  3547.7  3504.9 
 
2. Costs of the Energiewende 
An important effect of EU and German environmental policies is on the price of 
energy. Because of the fear of “carbon leakage,” carbon intensive industries that are 
vulnerable to migrating out of the EU because of energy prices have their emissions 
credits provided free of charge. Similarly, the German government offers industries that it 
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desires to protect exemption from feed-in-tariffs beyond a certain level of 
consumption.205 In this way, protected industries benefit doubly by avoiding the costs of 
renewable energy but still enjoying the lower wholesale prices of energy that have 
resulted from increased supply. 
The exemption of vulnerable industries that are protected because of national 
interests has meant that much of the costs of the feed-in-tariffs and emissions credits have 
passed through to household consumers. These costs are reflected as taxes, levies, and 
network costs, which have increased more than tenfold from 1998 levels, with the EEG 
surcharge constituting 21% of household electricity bills and taxes comprising another 
23%.206 The average cost of electricity for a family of three has increased by 70% during 
this same timeframe, and the World Nuclear Association reports that from 2005 to 2014, 
residential electricity prices in Germany increased by more than the average U.S. total 
residential electricity cost, and German residents now pay roughly twice what French 
residents do for electricity.207  
While proponents of the Energiewende point to recent drops in the EEG surcharge 
and wholesale energy prices as indications that electricity costs are beginning to 
moderate, both the wholesale price and EEG surcharge are expected to increase through 
2025, with the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology predicting that wholesale prices will 
increase 70% by 2025.208  
Furthermore, wholesale prices and the EEG surcharge constitute only a portion of 
the cost of the Energiewende. The decentralization of the grid due to renewable energies, 
as well as the regional concentration of these energies—with a much of the wind energy 
coming from the north—necessitates a significant expansion of the German power grid. 
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Studies indicate that Germany must build or upgrade 5,157 miles of transmission lines in 
order to properly connect renewable energies, and this is expected to cost 20 billion euros 
by 2022.209  
To this must be added the cost of energy efficiency measures like retrofitting 
buildings with upgraded insulation. Even market inefficiencies induced by the EEG cost 
money; it is estimated that the costs of redispatching traditional power plants (effectively 
paying them to throttle their output during renewable energy surges) will total 30 billion 
euros between 2016 and 2025.210  
All of these considerations substantiate estimates for the Energiewende; KfW 
Bankengruppe estimates the cost to be 262 billion euro by 2022, and in 2013 Minister of 
for the Environment said the cost could amount to one trillion euro by 2030. Add to this 
the costs associated with dismantling the country’s nuclear infrastructure (described in 
the foregoing chapter), and it becomes evident just how costly the transition will be.211  
3. Energy Imports and Natural Gas Dependence
Another effect of EU and German environmental measures is a decline in the 
extraction and use of indigenous energy resources such as the relatively dirty but 
abundant Lignite. Because renewable energies are as of yet incapable of providing all of 
Germany’s energy needs, Germany must rely more and more on energy imports to fill the 
gap. This is compounded with a concurrent move away from nuclear energy, which has 
traditionally satisfied up to 30% (Table 2) of the country’s electricity needs. Germany has 
increasingly favored natural gas as an alternative for three major reasons. Natural gas is 
considered a bridge between fossil fuels and renewable energy sources because of its 
relatively lower GHG emissions.212 Second, liberalization of the energy market, another 
objective of EU energy policy, has also tended to favor natural gas, as the market favors 
209 “Energiewende,” The Economist, July 28, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21559667. 
210 “Nuclear Power in Germany,” World Nuclear Association. 
211 Ibid. 
212 IEA, Germany, 52. 
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low-cost solutions vice long term investment.213 Finally, natural gas power plants can be 
switched from idle to high production in a relatively short time. Quick modulation 
supports the role of natural gas alongside renewable energies, which themselves tend to 
be cyclical (rising and falling with the sun and wind).214  
Because of Germany’s limited indigenous natural gas resources, increased gas 
demand has been satisfied by imports. Of the 91 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
consumed by Germany in 2013, nearly 90% was imported. Furthermore, natural gas 
imports are primarily piped to Germany from three major suppliers: Russia (39%), 
Norway (30%), and the Netherlands.215  
E. RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND ENERGY SECURITY 
The energy trilemma outlined in the literature review would lead one to predict 
that pursuing renewable energies is compatible with energy security. Renewable energies, 
while relatively more costly, should decrease dependence on other forms of energy, lead 
to reduced import dependence, and thus increase energy security. In practice, as we have 
seen in the Germany case study, renewable energies, when coupled with GHG reduction 
objectives, have led to an increased reliance on energy imports. This is expected to be 
replicated throughout the EU, as energy imports are expected to constitute 65% of EU 
energy needs by 2030.216 More troubling for energy security, however, is the decreasing 
diversity of energy types used (because of the move away from coal and nuclear power) 
and increased reliance on few energy suppliers.  
1. Russian Reliability 
As mentioned in the previous section, Germany imports roughly 30% of its 
natural gas from Russia. Germany is not an isolated case: 6 EU members import natural 
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gas exclusively from Russia and three—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—rely on a single 
pipeline and provider for this natural gas.217 
Relying on a single provider for energy needs violates principles of energy 
security. The dependence specifically on Russia is particularly troubling for two reasons. 
While Russia has the largest proven gas reserves (1,688 trillion cubic ft), its gas 
production was nonetheless expected to peak in 2010.218 This is in part because of a lack 
of spending on infrastructure that is not likely to change soon owing to Russia’s 
unwillingness to give foreign companies access to invest in its natural gas fields. 
Perhaps more troubling, Russia’s halting of energy exports—twice in Ukraine 
(2006 and 2009) and once to Belarus (2007)—highlighted concerns about its reliability as 
a trading partner and demonstrated its willingness to exercise energy resources as a hard-
power tool. Energy politics have increasingly set the context for Russia-West relations, 
and interpretations of Russian aggression (i.e., vis-à-vis Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 
2014) are often couched in terms of energy.219 
2. Renewable Energy Reliability and Viability of a Traditional Base 
A separate way in which renewable energies adversely affect energy security is in 
the unpredictable and unreliable nature of their sources. Renewable energies rely on 
natural phenomena such as sunlight and wind in order to function, and therefore fluctuate 
greatly in their output levels. Critics of German solar energy often cite an unfavorable 
climate and frequent cloud cover (as much as 6/8 of the year) as a reason that solar 
energy is not viable in Germany.220 Wind energy is similarly unpredictable and is often 
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strongest in areas removed from population, requiring costly transit infrastructure.221 
Germany’s increased dependence on intermittent renewable energies decreases German 
energy security and necessitates the use of back-up energies as mentioned in the previous 
section.  
The presence of renewable energies, coupled with EU and German incentive 
schemes, has deteriorated the viability of existing traditional energy bases. Because 
renewable energies do not expend fuel, the marginal cost of renewable energy is virtually 
nonexistent. This, along with EU and German incentives, allows renewable energy to be 
sold cheaply on the wholesale market, and causes transmission companies to prefer it. 
The result is decreased usage of traditional power plants. Whereas conventional power 
plants historically operated 6,000-7,000 hours in Germany, they now function in a “back-
up” capacity, running an average of 2,000-3,000 hours per year. This “merit-order-effect” 
was an intended consequence of Energiewende policy, but has greatly challenged the 
viability of traditional power plants, the financing of new ones, and has ultimately 
decreased energy security.222  
F. RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND SECURITY—A LIBERAL VIEW 
1. Interdependence and Loop Flows 
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of renewable energies required 
simultaneous investment into the underlying distribution grid both within and without 
Germany. The resulting higher degree of integration, and the presence of an energy 
market that spans the borders of the EU nations, increases the expectation of security 
based on the liberal framework set forth earlier in this paper. In this way, EU energy 
policy has succeeded at deepening the interdependence among member states, and is 
expected, therefore, to reduce conflict amongst the Union.  
There are, however, costs to increased interconnectedness, and the EU’s vision for 
a single energy market is meeting resistance in perhaps its biggest testbed. The Austria-
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Germany energy market, established in 2002, is the only larger transnational trading zone 
in Europe, and allows buyers throughout the zone equal access to electricity produced 
within it. During surges in the electricity production of renewable energies, wholesale 
prices for electricity drop, and the consequent increased demand throughout the zone—
sometimes as high as 10 gigawatts (GW)—quickly overwhelms the inadequate 5.5 GW 
of network capacity connecting the two countries.223  
Electricity, which travels along the path of least resistance, thus finds circuitous 
routes, or “loop flows,” through neighboring countries like Poland and the Czech 
Republic in order to reach its destination in Austria. A study funded by four neighboring 
states reported of instances where half of the flow between Austria and Germany 
transited via loops through neighboring countries.224 Inadequacy of transmission lines 
between the productive wind farms in northern Germany and the industry-heavy southern 
Germany is also blamed for loop flows.225 These unscheduled loop flows create 
disruptive congestion in the neighboring countries, and many of Germany’s neighbors 
have begun to install “phase-shifters” at their borders to limit cross-border flow. The 
increasing frequency of loop flows also prompted Poland to request that EU grid 
regulator ACER assess the costs of the flows.226 The ACER report, released in 2013, 
noted that supply imbalances and deviations in flow were posing a threat to energy 
supply security, and a subsequent European Commission report recommended that the 
Austria-Germany trading zone be split at times.227  
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The potential split of the Austria-Germany trading zone is a blow to the EU’s plan 
for a common electricity market, as is the installation of phase-shifters to limit cross-
border flows. Loop flows highlight the physical constraints to market integration, the 
present inability of the market to incentivize grid expansion, and the ability for instability 
generated by renewable energies to propagate across an interconnected system. Loop 
flows also hint at a more fundamental limitation. Energy policy remains a national 
prerogative, and the lack of coordination among EU members will continue to plague EU 
integration efforts and the interconnectedness of member states. If interconnectedness 
continues to be hampered by barriers like loop flows, the result could be a decrease in 
regional security.  
2. EU as an IGO 
The added competencies of environmental and energy policy have strengthened 
the EU as an IGO, and also increase the expectation of security per liberal 
interdependence theory. Energy forums provide another venue for EU member dialogue, 
mitigating conflict and promoting a socializing effect among EU members. Shared 
ownership in a collective environmental and energy policy, too, should act to improve 
unity within the EU. 
These liberal benefits of EU policy might not be shared with outside entities, 
however. Russia has largely appeared threatened by EU energy legislation. EU 
unbundling and reciprocity rules have been perceived as targeting Russian national 
energy giant Gazprom, and Russia has responded with attempts to undermine the EU 
through long-term bilateral contracts with EU members.228 While the effects of EU 
energy policy have yet to fully establish themselves, they might result in increased 
conflict with EU trading partners and thus decrease regional security. 
3. An Alternative View—The Undoing of the EU? 
The German renewable energy transformation might prove unrepresentative of 
the rest of the Union. Lying in the center of the EU, it was easy for Germany to integrate 
                                                 
228 Youngs, Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, 39. 
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with its neighbors’ networks and thus boost cross-border energy sales. It had the strongest 
and largest economy of all of the EU countries and was thus well-positioned to take on 
the added costs of implementing EU green energy obligations. Political currents within 
the country shed the nuclear alternative and made the transition to renewable energies 
relatively easy. 
This could not be said of all EU countries. The energy question has revealed the 
different interests and abilities of the EU member countries. Other countries have had 
various commitments to existing energy sources—France to nuclear, and the Eastern 
European members to coal and natural gas—and were reluctant to part from them. While 
EU policy included the assurance that member countries would have autonomy in 
determining national energy mixes, they were nonetheless bound to GHG and renewables 
targets, and their existing commitments affect their ability to satisfy the EU mandates.  
Alternate and competing policies introduced at the national levels have hurt EU 
unity. Germany’s Feed-in-Tariff scheme has interacted negatively with EU-level policy. 
Germany also, along with France, favors the continued use of bilateral energy 
agreements, whereas the United Kingdom has sought deeper reliance on energy markets. 
The varying policies and interests have resulted in a lack of cohesion within the EU and 
in the EU’s external market policies.229 The disunity highlights the desire for autonomy 
in critical areas such as energy security. Members, for instance, have been hesitant to 
share information regarding infrastructure vulnerabilities with one another, and the 
national policies indicate a “renationalization of energy policies.”230 Furthermore, EU 
cohesion is being attacked from without, as Russia continues to undermine EU policy and 
pursue bilateral relations with member states (as can be argued with Nord Stream). 
Disunity in the EU caused by green energy policies has the potential of decreasing 
regional security.  
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
230 Rosner, “Disunity,” 170; Camilla Bausch, Ennid Roberts, Lena Donat, and Christine Lucha, 
European Governance and the Low-Carbon Pathway: Analysis of Challenges and Opportunities Arising 
from Overlaps between Climate and Energy Policy as Well as from Centralisation of Climate Policies 
(Berlin: Ecologic Institut, 2014), 62, http://cecilia2050.eu/publications/254. 
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4. Energy Poverty 
The cost of green energy initiatives has been largely borne by individual 
consumers. These costs disproportionately affect the poor, who already spend a larger 
portion of their income on energy. The rapidly rising energy costs have brought many in 
the EU into energy poverty. According to a study funded by the European Commission, 
nearly 11% of EU citizens were not able to keep their homes adequately warm in 2012, 
and a similar percentage reported issues with paying utility bills on time. Energy poverty 
is regionally concentrated, and affects the southern and eastern member states 
disproportionately; while energy poverty affects fewer in Germany, rates average closer 
to 20% for countries such as Portugal, Romania, Cyprus, Hungary, and Bulgaria.231 One 
of the effects of increased energy prices—namely, a reduction in consumption (or 
increase in efficiency, as it is coined)—might be touted as a success but also indicates the 
growing concern of energy poverty.  
While energy poverty might not be as present a concern for Germany as it is for 
Germany’s southern and eastern neighbors, Germany’s emissions goals are more 
ambitious than those of its neighbors, and energy prices will continue to rise. Combined 
with costs associated with the nuclear phase-out, debt and energy poverty will likely 
become increasing concerns in Germany. 
The added toll of green energy policies, combined with already depressed 
economies in many of the hardest-hit countries, has great security implications for 
member countries and the EU as a whole, and has the potential to foment civil unrest and 
political upheaval.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Germany and the EU have made progress in share of renewable energies on the 
grid, but barring any significant developments, Germany is likely to fall short of 
consumption and emissions goals, and it has saddled itself with increasing energy costs 
                                                 
231 Steve Pye, Audrey Dobbins, Claire Baffert, Jurica Brajković, Ivana Grgurev, Rocco De Miglio, 
and Paul Deane, “Energy poverty and vulnerable consumers in the energy sector across the EU: analysis of 
policies and measures,” Insight_E, May 2015 Policy Report, 15, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/
documents/INSIGHT_E_Energy%20Poverty%20-%20Main%20Report_FINAL.pdf. 
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and debt. While German and EU green energy policies would have been expected to 
increase energy security, they have actually acted to decrease energy security and overall 
security and stability in a number of respects. Germany, as an example, is now more 
dependent on energy imports than ever, and these imports are coming from fewer and 
less reliable sources. The unreliability inherent in renewable energies and their decreasing 
the viability of existing energy sources further decreases energy security in Germany. 
While increasing interdependence and a strengthened institutional framework should act 
as a stabilizing force within the EU, this could be offset by a backlash at the 
consequences of an increased share of renewables on the grid. Furthermore, to the extent 
that strengthening EU authority on energy issues is perceived as threatening to outside 
entities, it may also instigate conflict from without. All-the-while, growing disunity of 
interest, financial capacity, and internal policy threatens EU fabric from within. Finally, 
rising energy poverty rates and nation debt loads have the potential to foment unrest and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the German case demonstrates, energy security is a complex matter. Initiatives 
like Nord Stream 2 and Germany’s Energiewende transition to renewable energies were 
intended to improve energy security but may have unintended consequences that actually 
decrease it. Nord Stream 2 increases German natural gas import capacity, but therefore 
has the potential effect of making Germany more reliant on Russian imports, thus making 
it susceptible to Russian manipulation. Renewable energies were expected to make 
Germany less dependent on fossil fuel imports but may not achieve this effect, especially 
if Germany becomes more dependent on back-up natural gas power plants for dispatch 
needs. Furthermore, renewables introduce reliability—and thus security—problems of 
their own, with energy supply becoming dependent on intermittent weather patterns. As 
we have seen, the transition to renewables may also have a negative impact on energy 
security by its threatening the economic viability of traditional power sources that the 
grid cannot yet part with.  
Pursuing energy security involves trade-offs. It is not a unitary objective, and 
exists in a “trilemma” with the other energy objectives of efficiency and ecology. 
Renewables, for instance, which are touted to improve energy security (albeit debatably) 
and reduce GHG emissions, have done so at increased energy costs to households. Even 
nuclear energy, which is championed as the perfect mix of low GHG emissions and costs 
and high security, has security risks and environmental hazards of its own, and Germany 
will undoubtedly spend the next century paying for the dismantling of its nuclear 
infrastructure and mitigating its environmental effects.  
Then there are the not-so-straight-forward implications of energy security on 
overall regional stability and security. While Germany may increase its energy security 
by installing the Nord stream 2 pipelines, bypassing Eastern European pipelines will 
likely deteriorate the economic situations in these countries and will make them more 
susceptible to Russian influence and aggression, and these two effects may decrease 
security for the region. The incredible costs of both the nuclear phase-out and EU-wide 
transition to renewable energies will increase concerns of energy poverty and expose the 
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region to increased risks of economic downturn, which in turn may threaten democracy 
and thus security and stability in the region.  
Energy policy reveals the limits of the EU’s influence. While the liberal ideals 
upon which the EU were founded have been indicated in the 70 years of relative peace 
that Europe has enjoyed since the founding of the IGO, the EU’s vision for an “ever 
closer union” appears to be bumping into popular and political unwillingness for further 
integration. Vital national interests like energy policy, it seems, remain squarely as 
national prerogatives. This is demonstrated in the bilateral Nord Stream 2 negotiations as 
well as in Germany’s unilateral decision to abandon nuclear energy. Furthermore, even 
though Germany’s Energiewende is consistent with EU-wide goals, the policies 
introduced with the German EEG act have been seen as undermining EU-wide initiatives 
like the ETS. Continued attempts at integrating the Union may thus have the opposite 
effect of pulling it further apart (as we have seen with EU migration policy), and an 
institution founded on the principle of energy security might be undone because of it. The 
weakening of the EU will—according to liberal theory—likewise weaken stability and 
security in the region.  
Finally, while politics constrain energy policy, the case of the nuclear phase-out 
serves as an example in which energy issues can influence political dynamics. The 
nuclear issue was crucial to the Green Party’s rise as a mainstream party. While the final 
impact on German political dynamics of this development has yet to be seen, the rise of 
the Green Party and other parties after it may destabilize German democracy if the result 
is a further polarization of the German political system. 
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